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ABSTRACT
The following thesis is an examination of the Thirty Years’ War. This conflict,
from 1618-1648 in the “Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation,” was the
culminating conflict of the Reformation era and set the stage for the modern world.
Much scholarly debate in recent years has centered on whether or not the Thirty Years’
War was a “religious” conflict. A great deal of recent work has tended to minimize or
discount the religious element of the conflict.
This current thesis attempts to engage this debate and to argue that the war’s
origins did indeed lie in religious concerns. This is so because the Thirty Years’ War was
the final conflict necessitated by the Reformation challenges to the church-state nexus of
Corpus Christianum (Christendom). The war was the final struggle for the shape and
future of Christendom and its origins were decidedly religious. Yet, as this work shows,
its effects were, paradoxically, the birth of the “irreligion” of the Enlightenment era as
well as the launch of the ascendancy of nation-state structures and concerns in early
modern Europe.

INTRODUCTION
The series of interrelated conflicts, which engulfed most of the powers of
Continental Europe from 1618-1648, has come to be known as the Thirty Years’ War.
The setting for the conflict was the “Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation”
(primarily the portions comprising modern-day Germany and the Czech Republic). Over
the course of thirty years, Protestant rulers and armies from Germany, Sweden, Denmark,
and the Netherlands clashed with the Catholic militaries of the Habsburg monarchy
(German and Spanish). Additionally, Roman Catholic France would become a dominant
participant in the second half of the war.
At first glance, this would seem to be the final conflict in a series of “wars of
religion” flowing from the splintering of Christendom due to the Protestant Reformation.
As Peter H. Wilson remarks, “The assumption that the Thirty Years’ War had been a
religious conflict seemed so self-evident it was scarcely questioned.”1 For years, the
scholarly and popular consensus characterized the Thirty Years’ War as a devastating
religious conflict which so exhausted the resources of Christianity in the West that it
ushered in the modern era of the secular nation-state. While this view is still widespread,
many scholars since the latter part of the twentieth century have asserted that the Thirty
Years’ Wars was, in actual fact, primarily a political conflict based around objections to
imperial Habsburg rule. Thomas Cahill echoes the recent trend away from religious
causation when he writes that the Thirty Years’ War involved “most of Europe in bloody
disputes over religion and territory – or, rather, starting with religion and ending in
territory, ending indeed in 1648 with no one among the exhausted combatants able to
1

Peter H. Wilson, The Thirty Years’ War: Europe’s Tragedy (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap
Press, 2009), 7.
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articulate persuasively why they had been fighting each other for thirty years. … With
few exceptions, the results established the map of Europe as it stands today. But no one
will ever be able to begin to account for the blood that was shed.”2
Certainly, any examination of the Thirty Years’ War does cause one to wonder at
the shocking brutality and seeming senselessness of so many aspects of the conflict.
Nonetheless, it is important for the church historian to seek to understand the origins and
effects of this war. The answers to questions of cause and effect are important for
understanding the history of modern Europe as well as the history and influence of
Christianity in the wider Western world. The goal of this thesis is to clarify, as much as
possible, the causal factors leading up to the Thirty Years’ War as well to elucidate the
effects of this conflict in regard to the relationship between religion (Christianity) and the
European/Western world.
There is nothing like a “scholarly consensus” on the origins and effects of the
Thirty Years’ War. However, a trend toward secularizing the conflict has emerged in
20th and 21st century scholarship. Writing in 1938, C.V. Wedgwood typified the still
widely held view that the conflict’s origins were primarily religious/confessional, with
geopolitical causes stemming from the destabilization of Corpus Christianum3 during the
Protestant Reformation remaining secondary. More recently (1984, 1997), Geoffrey
Parker has led a team of scholars in producing a survey of the Thirty Years’ War which
has sought to place the conflict in an international setting with emphasis on hybrid origins
2

Thomas Cahill, Heretics and Heroes: How Renaissance Artists and Reformation Priests Created
Our World (New York: Doubleday/Nan A. Talese, 2013), 286. [emphasis added]
3

This term means the “Christian body” and is equivalent to what is more commonly referred to as
“Christendom.” It is the name for the melding of church and state under the leadership of the Roman
Catholic Church and an emperor or rulers loyal to Rome. This essay will use significant space to examine
the roots and significance of Corpus Christianum as it relates to the origins of the Thirty Years’ War.
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in imperial policy disputes and religious affection/confession. Of late, the analyses of
scholars such as Peter H. Wilson have sought to further diminish the religious dimension.
Wilson has argued that the Thirty Years’ War was not a religious conflict at all, except in
the sense that everyone in the 17th century was religious. Instead, he has declared that the
conflict was rooted in the problems inherent to the Imperial constitution.
With this divergence of opinion, it is easily seen that the way in which one
understands the role of Christian faith in the Thirty Years’ War is a crucial question.
Contrary to the course of modern scholarship which has tended to increasingly secularize
the conflict; this thesis will argue that its beginnings do indeed lie in religion. More
specifically, the case will be made that the war’s origins lie in the Western world’s
particular application of Christianity through a dominant conceptual and practical
framework known as Corpus Christianum or Christendom.
In addition to examining the critical analysis of its causes, attention will be given
to examining the lasting effects of the war for religion/Christianity in the West. For,
while it is correct that the origins of the Thirty Years’ War lie deeply in religious
concerns, it is equally true that the results of this conflict mark out the beginnings of
Christianity’s decline in the Western World over the last three and a half centuries. Many
of the themes of the Enlightenment and the secularization of society and government
were foreshadowed and/or born in the outcomes of the Thirty Years’ War.
To proceed with the above argument, this treatise will progress along the
following lines. The first section is a general introduction. Next, in part one, a thorough
historical examination of the concept of Corpus Christianum will set the stage for
understanding the way that religion/Christianity was envisioned and practiced leading up

3

to the Protestant Reformation. In this examination, it will quickly become apparent that
the Reformation could never have been merely an intellectual, theological dispute; rather,
it was nothing less than a reconceptualization of the entirety of socio-cultural norms and
political structures. This revision would have devastating consequences for the “Holy
Roman Empire of the German Nation” and would affect all of Europe by inaugurating the
great military conflict engulfing it from 1618-1648.
Part two begins with a representative summary of scholarly views on the origins
of the Thirty Years’ War. It continues as a brief survey of the conflict proper, followed by
an examination of the specific religious issues present in each period. Additionally, part
two is a necessary and useful transition toward the final phase of this thesis. One of the
truly fascinating aspects of the Thirty Years’ War is that while it can be divided up ad
infinitum by examining its various regional struggles, “the most important chronological
division is a relatively easy one: the period of the war before 1631; and the second phase
of the war, between 1631 and 1648.”4 The first phase is most distinctly rooted in religion.
The second phase, especially after France’s formal involvement from 1634/35 onward, is
when it became increasingly clear that the splintering of Christendom would ultimately
mean the splintering of the religious, Christian vision for society. Thus, part two of this
thesis is not only useful for seeing the essential religious nature of the war, especially in
its beginnings; it is also important for understanding that the shifting focus in the latter

4

Richard Bonney, Essential Histories: The Thirty Years’ War 1618-1648 (Oxford: Osprey
Publishing, 2002), 7.
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stages of the war would commence the decline of not only Corpus Christianum but of
Christian faith in the Western world.5
Part three will focus on the end of the war as formalized in the Peace of
Westphalia (1648) along with an examination of the results for the Habsburg dynasty and
the various state powers of Europe. Special attention will be given in this section to the
wider context of a now recognizably “modern” Europe. In the aftermath of the Thirty
Years’ War, the political map was radically redrawn. Also, the spiritual mold of Europe
had been recast. State churches and significantly “Christianized” societies did continue in
the Western world. However, never again would there be anything like Christendom as it
had existed from the latter stages of the Roman Empire up through the Reformation
period. Soon, the Enlightenment would hold sway and national identity would become
ascendant. Finally, the last section will bring a conclusion to this examination.

5

This statement may seem prima facie false, especially when one considers the amazing periods
of Evangelical revival in the First and Second Great Awakenings. However, it is the opinion of this author
that the virtual collapse of Christendom at the end of the Thirty Years’ War is the commencement point for
the growing secularization of the Western world and for the eventual, radical separation of church and state
which is seen in nearly all Western countries today.
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PART 1
THE RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND
OF THE THIRTY YEARS’ WAR
The dominant vision of human life – the religio-socio-political ether – in the
Western world at the time of the Reformation, and even still at the outset of the Thirty
Years’ War was Christendom. Hermann Dooyeweerd gives a concise and helpful
definition for this concept:
In the dominant medieval conception there was one great community of
Christendom, the corpus christianum [the “Christian body”]. The pope was its
spiritual head while the emperor was its worldly head. Their relation was not
analogous to the modern relation between church and state, for a differentiated
body politic did not exist … National differentiation was largely unknown. The
fact that the substructure was undifferentiated enabled the church of that time
period to control the whole of cultural life.6
This definition helps to explain why the roots of the Thirty Years’ War cannot possibly
be viewed in merely secular terms. Instead, it was the culmination of the religio-social,
political upheaval brought on by the Protestant Reformation. Christendom was religion
and politics and culture. To see its importance for the origins of the conflict under
examination, a brief survey of its development from the latter stages of the Roman
Empire up to its role in the “Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation” is in order.
Corpus Christianum: The Religious, Social, and Political Framework of the West
from Constantine to the Reformation
Constantine and the Christianization of the Roman Empire

6

Herman Dooyeweerd, Roots of Western Culture: Pagan, Secular, and Christian Options
(Toronto: Wedge Publishing Foundation, 1979), 76.
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After years of intermittent and sometimes brutal persecution at the hands of the
Roman Empire, the Christian church happily embraced the newly Christian(ized)
Emperor, Constantine. After conquering his rival Maxentius in 312 under the “sign of the
cross,” Constantine officially ended Christian persecution in 313.
Yet, he was not done. According to Eusebius, Constantine was God’s instrument
to bring about a Christianized Roman Empire – an agent to meld together religion and
state, Christianity and empire.7 Routinely criticized by modern voices as a religious
impostor, Constantine’s first official acts as sole emperor were to refuse to enter the
Capitolium and sacrifice to Jupiter, and to unveil a political theology in which he was in
“opposition to sacrifice.”8 In fact, “when Constantine’s Arch was unveiled three years
after he took Rome, the emperor was depicted not facing Jupiter but with his back to the
god.”9
The Christian devotion of Constantine can be debated. However, there is no doubt
that Christianity was being fused with the life of the Rome. Van Leeuwen remarks:
“Originally the Roman cult of state was centered in the king, who united in his person all

7

Eusebius, The Church History, trans. Paul L. Maier (Grand Rapids: Kregel Academic &
Professional, 2007 [original publication – ca. 324-325]). For instance, Eusebius writes on pg. 332: “His
enemy prostrate, the mighty victor Constantine, outstanding in every virtue godliness confers, as well as his
son Crispus, a ruler most dear to God and like his father in every way, won back their own eastern
provinces and combined the Roman Empire into a single whole, as in former days, bringing it all under
their peaceful rule … And so all tyranny was eradicated, and the kingdom that was theirs was preserved,
secure and undisputed, for Constantine and his sons alone. They, having first cleansed the world of hatred
to God and knowing all the good He had conferred on them, showed their love of virtue and of God, their
devotion and gratitude to the Almighty, by their actions for all to see.”
8

Peter Leithart, Defending Constantine: The Twilight of an Empire and the Dawn of Christendom
(Grand Rapids: IVP Academic, 2010), 66-67.
9

Ibid., 67.
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political and sacral functions.”10 Under Constantine, the political and sacral functions
were progressively Christianized and Corpus Christianum was born.
Augustine: Two Cities in Theory, Christendom in Practice
As Christendom progressed it also suffered a great challenge: “With … Emperor
Theodosius’ banning of other cults in 391, many Christians in Augustine’s time dared to
hope … that there would be a Christian Empire obeying and fulfilling God’s will on
Earth directly. … The sack of Rome by the Visigoths in 410 dashed such hopes.”11
The challenge of answering Christian concerns and pagan criticism in light of this
sudden reversal fell to the great bishop and theologian Augustine of Hippo. He responded
with his magnum opus, De Civitate Dei, “On the City of God.” In this masterwork,
Augustine espoused his doctrine of the “city of God” (civitas Dei) and the “city of earth”
(civitas terrena): “Accordingly, two cities have been formed by two loves: the earthly by
the love of self, even to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the love of God, even to
the contempt of self. The former, in a word, glories in itself, the latter in the Lord.”12
Essentially, Augustine developed a theory which rejected the fusion of church and
state. Again, van Leeuwen’s comments are helpful: “Although he gives Christiana
tempora their due and sincerely admits that the conversion of the emperor and the
abolition of the pagan state cult were both important events, he never speaks of a
Christian empire.”13

10

Arend Th. van Leeuwen, Christianity in World History, trans. H.H. Hoskins (New York:
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1964), 273.
11

Kim Paffenroth, Introduction to St. Augustine. The City of God, trans. Marcus Dods (New York:
Barnes & Noble, Inc., 2006 [originally published ca. 412-426]), xiv.
12

St. Augustine, The City of God, 14.28 (pg. 569).
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Van Leeuwen, Christianity in World History, 280.
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Nevertheless, theory and practice often differ. So they did for one considered the
father of the Western church. In a letter (ca. 408) to a Donatist bishop, Vincentius,
Augustine defended the right of civil powers to work with the church to compel heretics
and sinners to re-enter the fold of God:
For originally my opinion was that no one should be coerced into the unity
of Christ, that we must act only by words, fight only by arguments and prevail by
force of reason, … But this opinion of mine was overcome not by the words of
those who controverted it, but by the conclusive instances to which they could
point. For in the first place there was set over against my opinion my own town,
which, although it was once wholly on the side of Donatus, was brought over to
the Catholic unity by fear of the imperial edicts.14
Though Augustine masterfully laid out a theology of “two cities formed by two
loves,” he repeatedly leaned toward a central role for the state in reclaiming heretics and
the impenitent.15 There is no doubt that Augustine’s motives in this use of the state were
noble: to rescue, by punishment, those who had far worse coming to them in the afterlife
if they were not reclaimed for God and His church. Nonetheless, Augustine’s theory was
overridden by his application of it, and this represented a further step toward the merging
of church and state.16

14

St. Augustine, “Letter 93.” In From Irenaeus to Grotius: A Sourcebook in Christian Political
Thought, ed. Oliver O’ Donovan and Joan Lockwood O’ Donovan (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdman’s
Publishing Co., 1999), 132.
15

For instance, not only did Augustine respond to the Donatists as in Letter 93, he also, in writing
to a civil magistrate named Macedonius in what we know as Letter 153 (ca. 414), again defended the use of
civil punishments for reclaiming the fallen from the church. Also, in Letter 189 (ca. 418) to Count
Boniface, he defended a form of “just war theory” by saying that the Christian could, with clear conscience,
serve in the military.
16

Sadly, many modern historians – particularly at the popular level – have not been kind:
“Augustine, for all his greatness, has become in old age the type of the evil cleric, full of mercy for those
who fear him, full of seething contempt for those who dare oppose him, scheming to make common cause
with Babylon and whatever state-sponsored cruelty will, in the name of Order, suppress his opposition.
There is not a country in the world today that does not still possess a few examples of the type.” Thomas
Cahill, How the Irish Saved Civilization: The Untold Story of Ireland’s Heroic Role from the Fall of Rome
to the Rise of Medieval Europe. (New York: Anchor Books, 1995), 67.
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The Decline and Rise of Rome
Over the centuries following Augustine, the Western Roman Empire, centered in
the city of Rome, continued to experience decline. It was in the Eastern Empire, with its
new imperial capital of Constantinople, that a vision of a city of God on earth under an
imperial representative of God on earth would move forward: “A Christian emperor,
ruling as the sponsor and protector of the Church, could serve not merely as Christ’s ally
in the great war against evil, but as His representative on earth, ‘directing, in imitation of
God Himself, the administration of the world’s affairs.’”17
Yet, the idea of Corpus Christianum in the West did not disappear, it merely
changed. In the late 6th and early 7th centuries, Pope Gregory I was ruling in Rome. A
man known for humility as well as skill and learning, Gregory is “reputed to be the
theoretical founder, along with Cassiodorus and Isidore, of Christian ‘RomanoGermanic’ kingship.”18 In many respects, Gregory and the popes after him had little
choice but to take on a dual role: “To some extent, the popes – the good ones, at least –
would have no choice but to take on the role of emperor, certainly insofar as the
protection of Italy was concerned.”19
In his growing power as the Pope, Gregory and those after him were merely
beginning to exercise in a wider way the influence and primacy they had long held as
bishops of the city of Rome. As early as CE 96, one early Roman abbot, Clement, had
written to admonish the church at Corinth in a struggle they were having with deposing
17

Tom Holland, The Forge of Christendom: The End of Days and the Epic Rise of the West (New
York: Anchor Books, 2008), 7. Holland’s quotation comes from Eusebius in his Life of Constantine, 3.3.1.
18

Oliver O’ Donovan and Joan Lockwood O’ Donovan, eds. From Irenaeus to Grotius: A
Sourcebook in Christian Political Thought (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdman’s Publishing Co., 1999), 195.
19

Thomas Cahill, Mysteries of the Middle Ages: The Rise of Feminism, Science, and Art from the
Cults of Catholic Europe (New York: Doubleday/Nan A. Talese, 2006), 42.
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some local presbyters. His letter ended with a command to “Be quick to return our
delegates in peace and joy, Claudius Ephebus and Valerius Bito, along with Fortunatus.
In that way they will the sooner bring us news of that peace we have prayed for and so
much desire, and we in turn will the more speedily rejoice over your healthy state.” The
growing influence of the bishop of Rome would grow into the papacy, an increasingly
mixed role of spiritual and secular rule. In AD 800, this transformation and growing
power would crown a Frankish king as “Holy Roman Emperor” and formalize Corpus
Christianum in the West.
Charlemagne and the Official Beginning of the “Holy Roman Empire”
During the period of growing separation between the churches and political
structures of the Eastern and Western Roman Empire, new religio-political threats were
also rising. Islam was a growing force, and it had begun to press at every point of the
imperial borders. Eventually, Islamic expansion would conquer North Africa. This
opened the way for Muslim forces to invade Spain and begin pressing toward Northern
Europe. Additionally, Islamic expansion was also seeking inroads from the East. In this
setting, the northern tribes of the old Roman Empire’s holdings began to take on greater
importance. The papacy and church at Rome were forced to begin making alliances with
Frankish and Germanic kings. Eventually, one great Frankish king would rise to the fore:
Charles le magne (rough Latin for “the great”) or Charlemagne.
Charlemagne, and other Frankish kings before him, had long cooperated with and
protected the Pope and Rome from military and political threats. In the summer of CE
800, Charlemagne had come to Rome to defend Pope Leo III in the face of charges of
corruption by Roman nobles. Charlemagne lingered in Rome until Christmas. Then,
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while Charles went to the basilica of St. Peter to worship mass on Christmas Day, he
kneeled to pray before the tomb of the apostles. Mark Noll describes what happened next
as he rose from his knees:
As he did so, Pope Leo III advanced, and in the words of an eyewitness, “the
venerable holy pontiff with his own hands crowned Charles with a most precious
crown.” Then the people – in fact, ‘all the Roman people,’ according to the annals
of the Franks – arose as one. They had been told what to say; three times a great
shout rang out: “Carolo Augusto of Deo coronato, magna et pacific imperatori,
vita et victoria” (To Charles Augustus, crowned by God, great and peace-giving
emperor of the Romans, life and victory).20
What this moment represented was the result of all the moves toward
Christendom that had been made up to this point. The concept and outworking of Corpus
Christianum was largely crystallized in this moment. The synthesis and cooperation
which came from this culminating act, “symbolized … an integrated view of life in which
everything – politics, social order, religious practice, economic relationships, and more –
was based on the Christian faith as communicated by the Roman Catholic Church and
protected by the actions of secular rulers.”21
This would be the dominant religio-social and political framework that endured
up to the Protestant Reformation. This “medieval synthesis” inserted the Roman Catholic
Church into politics and daily life and also injected the concerns of state and empire into
the church. Again, Noll is helpful in summarizing the significance of what this would
come to mean:
With its central sacramental role in the salvation of sinners, the church also
assumed immense significance for every other aspect of culture. Since the
salvation of sinners is the most important imaginable task in life, leaders of the
political sphere must cooperate with the church as it fulfills its spiritual tasks;
20

Mark A. Noll, Turning Points: Decisive Moments in the History of Christianity (Grand Rapids:
Baker Academic, 2000), 108-109.
21

Ibid., 122.
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those who exercise the mind must direct learning in ways that are compatible with
church teaching; economic relationships should be structured to support the
church in its mission; and ideals for social order will naturally imitate patterns
that God has set out for the church. In other words, with the widespread
agreement that salvation was the most important reality, and the further agreement
that salvation was communicated through and by the sacraments, it had to follow
that the church, as the administrator of the sacraments, should offer a foundation
for everything else.22
Thus, with the solidification of Christendom, the entire pattern of medieval life was set.
This pattern and its influence on all of Western European life would continue, with only
minor adjustments, until the cosmos-shaking events of the Reformation.
The Rise of a Germanic “Holy Roman Empire”
Under Charlemagne, a period of cultural and spiritual renewal would begin
known as the Carolingian Renaissance. However, though Charlemagne was a great ruler,
his empire was vast and the structures that supported it were not well developed. In time,
challenges from nomadic marauders, as well as the general ineffectiveness of
Charlemagne’s heirs, would destabilize the Holy Roman Empire. This set the stage for
the system known as feudalism. In this arrangement a powerful local ruler reigned as
lord, while those who lived on and worked his land and holdings were his vassals.
Despite the continuing centrality of the Roman Catholic Church, it was also
affected by feudal arrangements. The “state,” in the form of local rulers, began to
exercise increased influence over the appointment of bishops and other church
prerogatives. The involvement of the state further intensified as the title of Holy Roman
Emperor shifted from Frankish to Germanic hands. This was particularly true under the
Germanic king Otto the Great who revived the Holy Roman Empire in the West in 962:
Otto claimed to be the successor of Augustus, Constantine, and Charlemagne,
although his actual power was confined to Germany and Italy. At first the papacy
22

Mark A. Noll, Turning Points, 125. [emphasis added]
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looked to the German king for protection against the unruly Italian nobles who for
a century had been making a prize of the papacy. From the church’s viewpoint,
however, this arrangement had its drawbacks, for the Germanic kings continued
to interfere in ecclesiastical affairs – even in the election of popes.23
In time, one would rise to the papacy who would challenge this intervention. Pope
Gregory VII (1073-1085) formally outlawed the practice of “lay investiture,” or the
granting of ecclesiastical office by non-church officials (i.e., Germanic kings/emperors).
Eventually, the Holy Roman Emperor, Henry IV, contested this edict in an attempt to
force the abdication of Gregory. However, Gregory took an “utterly unprecedented step
[and] responded in ferocious kind. Henry’s subjects, the Pope had pronounced, were
absolved from all their loyalty and obedience to their earthly lord – even as Henry
himself, that very image of God on earth, was … excommunicated from the Church.”24
It was uncertain whether Henry would bow. In fact, he tried not to. Yet, without
the support of the Roman Catholic Church, Henry was severely undermined as a “Holy
Roman Emperor.” His nobles turned against him and Henry was forced to seek
forgiveness from the Church. He knew that he had to intercept Pope Gregory VII and do
penance, in the hopes that the Pope would change his mind. Eventually, Gregory and
Henry met at the castle of Canossa. Morris Bishop describes the scene: “At Gregory’s
order, Henry stood without in the January snows, barefoot, gowned in coarse penitent’s
garb, and stripped of all his regalia. Gregory kept him there for three days and two nights
until at last the pope, in Christian charity, deemed the humiliation the emperor had

23

Bruce L. Shelley, Church History in Plain Language: Updated 2 nd Edition (Dallas: Word
Publishing, 1995), 180.
24

Tom Holland, The Forge of Christendom, xvi.
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suffered to be sufficient.”25 Of course, after Henry regained his power and grip over the
German nobles, he again fought with Pope Gregory VII, and the papacy nearly came to
ruin by the fourteenth century as rival popes fought for control of the Church.
Nonetheless, the incident at Canossa had moved the concept of Corpus
Christianum even closer to the form it would take prior to the Reformation. The melding
of church and state produced friction. At the end of the day, though, the church, with its
hold on the sacraments and salvation, possessed the true power in the Holy Roman
Empire. This was especially true as the ardently Roman Catholic Habsburg (also,
Hapsburg and House of Austria) monarchy grabbed the reigns of leadership in the Holy
Roman Empire.
“The Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation” on the Cusp of the Reformation
Under the House of Austria, Corpus Christianum reached its apex. Hans
Hillerbrand comments: “The house of Habsburg dominated German history from the late
Middle Ages until the time of Napoleon in that most emperors during that time came
from the house of Habsburg.”26 Yet, Christendom under the Habsburgs was also greatly
challenged both by Protestant reforms and the opposition of Roman Catholic – but nonHabsburg – France. Despite these obstacles, Corpus Christianum under the Habsburgs
was the dominant reality of the Western world.
Over time the power of the House of Austria grew exponentially. In his masterful
study of the Habsburgs, H.G. Koenigsberger summarized their role in European history:

25

Morris Bishop, The Middle Ages (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., A Mariner Book, 1968,

1996), 49.
26

Hans J. Hillerbrand, Historical Dictionary of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation:
Historical Dictionaries of Religions, Philosophies, and Movements, No. 27 (Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow
Press, Inc., 2000), 99.
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[F]or nearly one hundred and fifty years, from 1516 until 1659, it actually
dominated European politics … It is not difficult to see how this dominance came
about. Charles V’s inheritance of the crowns of four major dynasties, Castile,
Aragon, Burgundy, and Austria, the later acquisition by his house of the crowns
of Bohemia, Hungary, Portugal, and, for a short time, even of England, and the
coincidence of these dynastic events with the Spanish conquest and exploitation
of the New World – these provided the house of Habsburg with a wealth of
resources that no other European power could match.27
Of course, with such power exerted over all of Europe, the Habsburgs had many enemies.
It seems that Charles V had much desired to defend the Catholic faith and bring
about unity in Christendom.28 However, his holdings were too vast and his intervention in
the affairs at the Diet of Worms too bold for Christendom to support him. Charles sought
to challenge Luther and the Reformers in Germany but received no praise for doing so.
After the imperial Diet at Worms, Charles issued the Edict of Worms on May 25, 1521,
against Martin Luther and those who followed him. This edict condemned Luther as a
heretic and made him an outlaw. Though Charles V issued this edict in an attempt to
uphold the unity of Christendom and the doctrine of the Catholic faith, he only increased
animosity toward himself and the Holy Roman Empire. The followers of Luther
obviously disagreed with Charles, and the papacy resented his aggressive attempts at
issuing religious edicts. The stage was set for great conflict.
Summary
Constantine, Augustine, Charlemagne and others could never have imagined the
course that Christendom would take. However, this survey of the religio-social and

27

H.G. Koenigsberger, The Habsburgs and Europe: 1516-1660 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1971), xi.
28

Charles, writing to his aunt about his succession said “that if the said election is conferred on
our person … we will be able to accomplish many good and great things, and not only conserve and guard
the possession which God has given us, but increase them greatly and, in this way, give peace, repose and
tranquility to Christendom, upholding and strengthening our holy Catholic faith which is our principal
foundation.” Ibid., 10.

16

political framework it represented, though lengthy, helps to set the stage for further
understanding the origins of the Thirty Years’ War. Below are the most salient points:
1. From the time of Constantine, Christianity adopted a new self-understanding as
persecution ceased and Christian faith became dominant in the Roman Empire.
This self-understanding was the burgeoning idea of a church-state complex which
would embody the ideals of God’s kingdom in the Roman Empire.
2. Augustine, dealing with the reality of Western decline and the sack of Rome,
began to re-envision the role of empire and the church. He developed a powerful
theory of “two cities.” However, in practice he still advocated a large role for the
state in the affairs of faith. Though he did not intend to birth Corpus Christianum,
as the fount of Western, Roman Catholic theology, his actions spoke loudly and
inculcated the idea of Christendom into the consciousness of the Catholic faith.
3. An explicit vision for the state as “heaven on earth” was developed in the East.
The West did not follow this conception exactly. Nonetheless, the decline of
imperial structures in the West brought about the rise of the papacy. The pope
became not only head of the Church but also of a Christianized Roman Empire.
4. With the coronation of Charlemagne by Leo III, Christendom was solidified. The
power of “king-making” flowed from the church, as well as the power of
salvation through the sacramental system. Thus, the entire religio-social and
political milieu of the West became focused around the Roman Catholic Church.
5. Certain emperors, particularly the Germanic kings, sought to curb the power of
the Church. Yet, in the end the Church’s dominant position, as well as the church-
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state complex of Corpus Christianum was only strengthened, as the Lay
Investiture Controversy made plain.
6. Eventually, most of Europe came into the hands of the Habsburgs. Under this
dynastic house, especially Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor of the “Holy Roman
Empire of the German Nation,” Corpus Christianum reached its apex. Yet,
resistance to the Habsburg’s growing power, as well as popular demand for
reform in the Roman Catholic Church, began to undermine Corpus Christianum.
Charles V, icon of Habsburg power and the Roman Catholic status quo, would
unwittingly undermine Christendom in his staunch attempts to defend it.
Luther’s impassioned stand at the Diet of Worms, coupled with Charles V’s
aggressive reaction, would continue to fan the flames of the burgeoning Reformation.
The Protestant Reformation initiated a thoroughgoing revaluation of Christianity in the
West. By definition, this would lead to conflict as every aspect of life in the “Holy
Roman Empire of the German Nation” was thrown into upheaval by the splintering of
Christendom.
The Protestant Reformation, Catholic Counter-Reformation, and Intractable
Problems for the “Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation”
The Revolutionary Nature of the Protestant Reformation
As previously mentioned, the chief human objective in the collective mind of
Corpus Christianum was salvation from the consequences of sin. This was accomplished
through grace conferred by the Church in the sacramental system. This understanding of
salvation was critical in ordering society and politics around the indispensable nature of
the Roman Catholic Church, the papacy, and the religio-social structures of Christendom.
18

And, though France was a growing center for Roman Catholic power, in many
ways the “Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation” was Christendom. Little wonder,
then, that with the 95 Theses on the Wittenberg door, Martin Luther unleashed a
firestorm that embroiled the whole of German and European society. Luther almost
certainly did not intend to let loose chaos in Corpus Christianum, but this was the result
of his and other Reformer’s actions.
Famously standing his ground at the Diet of Worms, Martin Luther argued for the
religious conscience of the individual and the doctrine of justification by faith alone. In
the modern Western world, these are hardly radical views. Yet, in Luther’s world, they
were revolutionary. Gradually, he would begin to question the very foundations of
Christian society: “Luther’s writings in 1520 only inflamed his terribly strained
relationship with Rome. ‘To the Christian Nobility’ questioned the church-state nexus
that had dominated Europe for almost a millennium. ‘The Babylonian Captivity of the
Church’ undercut the sacramental structure that was fundamental to Rome’s selfunderstanding."29 Additionally, Luther would return to Augustine the theorist in
developing his concept of “two governments/kingdoms.” Luther sounds very much the
theoretical Augustinian when he wrote, “And so God has ordained the two governments,
the spiritual [government] which fashions true Christians and just persons through the
Holy Spirit under Christ, and the secular [weltlich] government which holds the
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Unchristian and wicked in check and forces them to keep the peace outwardly and be
still, like it or not.”30
This return to Augustine’s theoretical “two cities,” in and of itself was a challenge
to Christendom. Too, Luther’s further remarks were absolutely revolutionary:
Each must decide at his own peril what he is to believe, and must see to it that he
believes rightly. Other people cannot go to heaven or hell on my behalf, or open
or close [the gates of either] for me. And just as little can they believe or not
believe on my behalf, or force my faith or unbelief. How he believes is a matter
for each individual’s conscience, and this does not diminish [the authority of]
secular governments. They ought therefore to content themselves with attending to
their own business, and allow people to believe what they can, and what they
want, and they must use no coercion in this matter against anyone.31
In a modern world where church and state are largely separate Luther’s assertion that this
“does not diminish the authority of secular governments” holds true. However, in the
religio-social, political framework of Corpus Christianum it most certainly did not.
The cohesion of religio-social and political life began to disintegrate. Initially,
Charles V, distracted by his far-flung empire and the Islamic threat of the Turks, did little
to work out the problems left by the Diet of Worms. In 1529, issuing a dictate to the Diet
of Speyer to enforce the conditions of the Edict of Worms, Charles sought to repair
Christendom. However, many princes and cities began instituting Lutheran practices in
their local congregations. Several drew up a solemn protest against Charles’ order and
became known as the “Protesting Estates,” giving the name “Protestant” to all who
challenged Rome and the structure of Corpus Christianum.32 The Protestant Reformation
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was soon to produce large-scale revolt and conflict in the “Holy Roman Empire of the
German Nation.” The Peasant’s War (1524-1526), the Schmalkaldic War between
Charles V and Protestant German Princes (1546-1547), wars of religion throughout the
16th century, etc. – all were the result of the revolutionary Reformation challenge to
Christendom.
The Peace of Augsburg
Yet, while the original idea of Corpus Christianum was disintegrating, it had also
simultaneously reformulated itself. The Protestant princes in Germany, the CalvinistReformed converts in France, Switzerland, and the Netherlands, as well as the remaining
rulers loyal to the House of Habsburg and/or the Roman Catholic Church – all of these
began to seek to live out Corpus Christianum with their own localized, confessional spin.
In the Holy Roman Empire, after much conflict, this attempt coalesced in the Peace of
Augsburg (1555)
By its terms, Lutheran princes, imperial knights, and free cities were guaranteed
security equal to that of the Catholic estates. However, it applied only to those
Protestants who adhered to the Augsburg Confession, so Calvinists and other
Protestants were excluded [though mostly tolerated]. It also proclaimed the
principle that each ruler would determine the religion of his domain and all
subjects must conform, a principle termed by seventeenth-century jurists Cuius
regio, eius religio (Latin, literally, “whoever the king, his religion”).33
While this seemed to provide a way for a reformulated, localized Corpus
Christianum to continue, this peace was doomed to failure. It had numerous problems
attendant to it, three of particular importance. First, it dictated that “in the free cities,
where both Lutheranism and Catholicism existed, the two faiths should share the
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churches.”34 This was an unmanageable arrangement in light of deep confessional
differences and the expectation of church-state unity leftover from the long centuries of a
wholly united Christendom. Second, there was a very controversial section, added in by
the Emperor, known as the “Ecclesiastical Reservation.” Heinze explains: “In simple
terms, this meant that if an ecclesiastical ruler became a Lutheran, he could not take his
property and income with him, but a Catholic successor should be elected in his place.”35
This clause was violated again and again and became a major source of enmity between
Lutherans and Catholics. Finally, the Peace of Augsburg completely ignored the
Reformed/Calvinist churches. In Germany proper, this was not as much of an issue
because Lutheranism was dominant. Still, in the wider Habsburg holdings of the Holy
Roman Emperor, this would become a serious problem.
The Catholic Response
In the face of the Protestant threat, the Roman Catholic Church was not idle.
Initially taken off-guard by the popularity of Luther and other Protestant Reformers,
eventually a “Counter-Reformation” began. In 1563, the Council of Trent concluded its
eighteen-year effort at outlining reforms for the Roman Catholic Church. Nearly every
area of doctrine was reconsidered, but its chief achievement was to reaffirm the Roman
Catholic vision for Christendom. It clarified Catholic teaching on contested doctrines, put
in place reforms to correct abuses of clergy, and it placed the parish priest at the center of
its mission – an important step for later efforts to (re)Catholicize the population.36
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Additionally, the council rejected the freedom of conscience ensconced in the
Protestant’s idea of sola Scriptura by reaffirming that Scripture as interpreted by the
Roman Catholic Church was the measure of orthodox teaching. Also, Luther’s position
on justification sola fide was largely rejected. The gift of salvation, according to Trent,
required free-will cooperation and continuation in good works (of which participation in
Roman Catholic sacramentalism was an important part) to grow in merit of grace.37 By
virtue of its designs for (re)Catholicizing the population as well as its reaffirmation of the
Roman Catholic sacramental structures of Corpus Christianum, the Council of Trent
strengthened the eroding position of the Roman Church. It also emboldened the strong
Catholic sympathies and designs of the Habsburg monarchy.
Additionally, this period witnessed the growth of a number of well-organized
orders and movements for reform. The best known of these is the Jesuits or the Society of
Jesus. Founded in 1539 by Ignatius Loyola, the Jesuits became a force for missionary
expansion and education in the Western world. Strengthened by Tridentine reforms and
the Jesuit order, the Roman Catholic Church engaged in an aggressive program of
(re)Catholicization. Marc R. Forster, in an important study, summarizes its outcomes:
In many parts of Catholic Germany … the Counter-Reformation began with an
effort to convert Protestant populations to Catholicism. ... Catholic princes
followed similar policies in the decades before the outbreak of the Thirty Years’
War, exacerbating political and religious tensions. These policies were an integral
aspect of Tridentine reform as well as part of the attempt to strengthen state
power.38
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So it was that the reforms of Trent and the unleashing of aggressive Catholic orders
began to further exacerbate tensions and work to undo the tenuous Peace of Augsburg.
Additional Religious Pressures
In addition to the fundamentally religious tensions present in the “Holy Roman
Empire of the German Nation,” there were important developments in France and Spain.
These circumstances would greatly add to the pressure being placed on the older order of
Corpus Christianum and would play a role in moving the whole of Europe toward the allencompassing conflict known as the Thirty Years’ War. A brief survey of the additional
religious and political pressures brought about in France and Spain is necessary before
moving toward a summary of the problems facing the German lands.
In Catholic (though non-Habsburg) France, attempts at rapprochement had been
made between Catholic and Huguenot (French Calvinist-Protestants) elements but had
largely failed. One last, important attempt was made to bring about Catholic-Protestant
peace in France. An arranged marriage between the Catholic, Margaret of Valois (sister
to King Charles IX), and the Protestant, Henry of Navarre (Bourbon heir), was supposed
to mend fences and provide a stabilizing treaty-by-marriage between Catholic and
Protestant factions. Many Huguenot nobles came to attend the ceremony in Paris on
August 18, 1572. Nevertheless, through a series of intrigues, an influential Huguenot
leader was assassinated on August 22. Catherine de’ Medici, Charles IX’s mother and
influential power-broker behind his rule, in fear of Huguenot retaliation ordered the rest
of the Huguenot leadership to be killed. This boiled over into the St. Bartholomew’s Day
Massacre on August 23, 1572, which spilled over into an intense persecution of
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Huguenots in France. Many of them fled during this period to the “Holy Roman Empire
of the German Nation,” especially to the regions of the Palatinate and Bohemia.
Once the French Calvinists were present in large numbers in German lands, a
phenomenal conversion from Lutheranism to Calvinistic-Reformed Christianity would
begin. This large-scale Protestant shift would come to be known as the “Second
Reformation.” It would have important ramifications for Germany and the Thirty Years’
War. Later, Emperor Ferdinand the II, would directly blame “the subversive Calvinist
schools” for the revolt of Bohemia which launched the conflict.39
In Catholic, Habsburg Spain, events were unfolding which also contributed to the
situation leading up to the Thirty Years’ War. Upon Charles V’s abdication of the
Habsburg throne in 1555/56 “The Habsburg dynasty had split into Austrian and Spanish
lines ... Charles had left his son, Philip II, the Spanish Habsburg territories, which
included the Netherlands, Italy, and the Spanish colonies in the New World. He had left
to his brother, Ferdinand I, the Austrian Habsburg territories [i.e., “The Holy Roman
Empire of the German Nation], including Hungary and Bohemia.”40 Philip II proved to
be a staunch and aggressive militarist for the papacy, Roman Catholicisim generally, and
Habsburg interests. A supporter of the Spanish Inquisition’s efforts to control Protestants
and a staunch warrior against the Calvinist rebellions in the Spanish Netherlands, Philip
II was responsible for decades of war against Protestant challengers to the HabsburgCatholic domination of Corpus Christianum.
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Eventually, Philip the II’s protracted war against the United Provinces (DutchReformed, northern territories in the formerly Spanish Netherlands) and remaining
Protestant elements in the south would be handed to his son Philip III. A “Twelve Years’
Truce” from 1609-1621 would bring about an end to the conflict. However, the continued
pressure placed on the southern Spanish Netherlands by the Calvinist north would
exacerbate tensions between Spanish, Dutch, and French interests – eventually dragging
all three parties into the Thirty Years’ War.
A final, important development involving Spain is seen in what is known as the
Oñate Agreement between Philip III and Ferdinand II. In this treaty in 1617, “the Spanish
ambassador, Oñate, secured a secret agreement with Ferdinand [presumptive successor to
his uncle, Holy Roman Emperor Matthias] by which he promised, if he became king of
Bohemia and emperor, to cede to Spain Piombino and Finale in Italy, and Alsace. By
means of [this] Habsburg family compact … Ferdinand was recognized as their candidate
for Bohemia and the Empire.”41 This important agreement had at least two results. First,
and most pressing, it practically guaranteed war would break out in the German lands.
Ferdinand was widely viewed as a danger to Protestants and an aggressive proponent for
the reunification of Corpus Christianum under the Catholic Habsburgs. Nicola Sutherland
poignantly remarks, “as a Jesuit-trained absolutist, Ferdinand was the last prince in
Christendom who could be expected to preside over an acceptable adjudication of the
Peace of Augsburg. This alarming prospect therefore caused Frederick [an imperial
elector] of the Palatinate, and others concerned, to set about stiffening the Protestant
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Union.”42 Second, it effectively placed the anti-Habsburg France into a pincer between
the Habsburg rulers – a reality which would exacerbate tensions and draw France into a
political strategy for the second half of the Thirty Years’ War (1635-1648).
Intractable Problems in the “Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation”
To summarize, there were several critical problems coalescing in the German
lands of the Holy Roman Empire which ultimately undermined the fragile Peace of
Augsburg and set the stage for the Thirty Years War. The most important of these are
summarized below:
1. Martin Luther and the Protestant Reformers – simply by virtue of questioning the
centrality of the sacramental system and the supremacy of the Roman Catholic
Church – would destabilize Corpus Christianum, thus creating conditions for
large-scale conflict and societal upheaval. It is probable this was not Luther’s
original intention. However, just by virtue of challenging the Church and the Holy
Roman Emperor, this was the outcome. This was certainly a religious issue.
2. The destabilization mentioned above led many Protestants to develop a “theology
of resistance” not before seen in Christendom. Luther’s radical attempt to
recapture the Augustinian theology of “two kingdoms” and Calvin’s decidedly
different attempts in Geneva to do the same were a challenge to the very structure
of religio-social, political reality. Additionally, tracts such as Vindiciae Contra
Tyrannos and Theodore Beza’s The Right of Magistrates over Their Subjects,
were strong Protestant attempts to detail the limitations of state power and to
provide a justification for rebellion against the powers in the name of religious
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principle. The above were religious issues which unleashed particular political
consequences. This was especially true in the initial Bohemian uprising which
started the Thirty Years’ War – a rebellion driven by the “revolutionary”
Huguenot refugees and other Reformed-Calvinist Christians in Prague.
3. In an age of confessionalization, strictly theological issues repeatedly became
political ones. An example of this was the strong divisions between Roman
Catholics, Lutherans and Reformed Christians regarding the Lord’s Supper. As
Heinze comments on a French effort to bring peace between Reformed Huguenots
and Roman Catholics, “Ironically, the meal in which Christians remember their
Lord’s sacrifice for them and express their unity in Christ was the rock on which
efforts to restore unity foundered.”43
4. When the above factors (Protestant challenge to unified Christendom, theological
justification for resisting authority, and confessional tensions) coalesced to
produce armed conflict between Protestants and Catholics, Corpus Christianum
suffered irreparable damage. In Germany, especially, the Peace of Augsburg was
doomed because it failed to deal with confessional differences, it failed to include
all groups (i.e., Reformed Christians) in the terms, it preserved inflammatory
provisions such as the “Ecclesiastical Reservation,” and it did nothing to put
limits on Jesuit and Tridentine (re)Catholicization in the region. Thus, efforts at
peace prior to the Thirty Years’ War simply miscarried due to inattention to the
underlying religious issues.
5. Imperial abuses, arising from confessional politics, were also on the rise. One
such case which exacerbated tensions in the run-up to the Thirty Years’ War was
43
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the intervention of then Emperor Rudolf II into the church politics at Donauwӧrth.
Due to Protestant resistance to a Roman Catholic procession in April 1606 on St.
Mark’s Day, Rudolf II sent in troops and restored the Donauwӧrth parish to
Catholic control. This incident led to the formation of the Protestant Union (1608)
and the Catholic League (1609) - informal agreements between religiously
aligned princes, cities, etc. for military defense. In response to escalating tensions
and pressure from the Protestant Union, Rudolf signed the infamous Letter of
Majesty on 9 July 1609. This granted the Bohemian Protestants far wider
freedoms than the Augsburg Peace of 1555. Essentially, every lord and free city
was allowed to choose which confession to follow. This undermined the Peace of
Augsburg, and as Peter Wilson remarks, “effectively created a parallel
government [in Bohemia].”44 Again, this was first a religious issue and only
secondarily a political one.
6. In the wake of the Tridentine reforms, an aggressive (re)Catholicization was being
played out in the “Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation.” The papacy was
driving this, and the Emperors leading up to the Thirty Years’ War (Rudolf II and
Matthias) were complacent. This was an issue of religious conviction with very
negative political implications as Imperial allowance or force (i.e., Donauwӧrth
incident) was being used to undo the advances of Protestantism.
7. Finally, the election of Ferdinand II, duke of Styria, as the new Holy Roman
Emperor – a result guaranteed by the Oñate Agreement – was a clear indication to
the Protestants in the empire that forced (re)Catholicization was coming. Twenty
years earlier, Ferdinand II had “taken his coronation oath [in Styria] to observe
44
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the liberties of his subjects; but these liberties, he said, had nothing to do with
religion. He had simply banished the Protestant leaders of the Styrian estates and
had replaced them with his own officials.”45 Like all of the other problems present
in the German lands, the election of Ferdinand II was a religious issue at its core.
As this survey moves forward now to an examination of the Thirty Years’ War
proper, the background is in place to interact with the claims of scholars regarding the
origins of the conflict. However, what should be abundantly clear at this juncture is that
every issue which modern scholarship might want to place in a merely “secular” sphere
is, at its core, a religious issue when it is placed in the overarching religio-social, political
context of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Corpus Christianum was a holistic
conception of Christian life on earth. The pressures of the Reformation along with the
issues it would continue to bring to the fore in “The Holy Roman Empire of the German
Nation” argue strongly that the origins of the Thirty Years’ War should be seen as
essentially religious.
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PART 2
A REVOLT TURNS INTO THE THIRTY YEARS’ WAR
At this point it is necessary to paint a representative picture of the various
scholarly interpretations regarding the nature of the Thirty Years’ War. This thesis has
already argued that its origins and early outworking should be seen as essentially
religious because they were grounded in a complex of issues all related to the
reformulation of Christendom due to the Protestant Reformation. This position will be
put in relief as various scholarly points are examined and a general critique is presented.
After the brief survey of scholarly opinion is interacted with, we will next survey
the conflict proper. This section offers the general contours of the Thirty Years’ War. The
conflict involved nearly every major and minor power in Europe and was lengthy and
complex. However, an attempt at understanding the overall flow of the conflict is
important for two reasons. First, it will help to establish the strongly religious nature of
the war in its first half, from 1618 to the death of the Swedish king, Gustavus Adolphus
in 1632. Second, it will also provide a transition point. For, as the second half of the
Thirty Years’ War moves forward from 1633-1648 it will become increasingly clear that
the war would ultimately lead to the dissipation of the religio-social, political vision of
Corpus Christianum.
Summary and Critique of Scholarly Views on the Origins of the Thirty Years’ War
The Proliferation of Writings about the Thirty Years’ War
The Thirty Years’ War has long captured the interest of historians and writers. As
soon as its hostilities were concluded in the Peace of Westphalia, contemporaries were
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already calling it “The Thirty Years’ War.”46 Also, within a relatively short amount of
time, it was receiving attention as an object for study and novelization. A few of these
attempts were particularly noteworthy. The first was the 1667 study The Conditions of
the German Empire by Samuel Pufendorf, a law professor who served in both Sweden
and Brandenburg as an official historiographer.47 Additionally, a very famous 1668
autobiographical novel by Hans Grimmelshausen entitled The Adventures of Simplicius
Simplicissimus (German: Der abenteuerliche Simplicissimus Teutsch) is considered
valuable source material.48 In this work, Grimmelshausen details the ordinary experience
of peasants during the war as well as the grotesque atrocities and brutal violence
committed by soldiers and peasants alike in the desperate days of the extended conflict.
Another important contemporary source was Hans Heberle’s diary accounts, Zeytregister
(1618-1672).49
Yet, while the above-mentioned source texts are important, they are literally but a
few of thousands of works published on the Thirty Years’ War. The conflict included
participants from Germany, Bohemia (Czech Republic), Hungary, Austria, Denmark,
Sweden, the Netherlands, France, Spain, Italy, and others. The dizzying number of
languages and perspectives is literally mind-boggling. Thus, while it is impossible to give
a complete survey of the scholarship on the Thirty Years’ War, it is imaginable to provide
a highly selective, yet representative summary of important scholarly views. In the
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paragraphs that follow, some notable sources will be mentioned and their arguments
summarized.
Important Scholarly Trends Regarding the Thirty Years’ War
An important scholarly history of the Thirty Years’ War was completed by the
playwright, poet, philosopher, and historian Johann Christoph Friedrich von Schiller. His
survey, History of the Thirty Years’ War in Germany, was published in 1791. He would
also publish an epic poem based around the Catholic General Albrecht von Wallenstein
in the late 1790’s which is considered “the equivalent of Shakespeare’s history play for
the German-speaking world.”50 Schiller’s history is instructive for it included elements of
the Gothic preoccupation with death along with an emphasis on the tragic inevitability of
the conflict.51 Yet, it is also notable as an archetype of the religious interpretation that
dominated until the latter part of the twentieth century. Schiller opened his account with a
strong statement that shaped the whole of his narrative:
From the beginning of the religious wars in Germany, to the peace of Münster
[one of the treaties in the larger Peace of Westphalia], scarcely any thing great or
remarkable occurred in the political world of Europe in which the Reformation
had not an important share. All the events of this period, if they did not originate
in, soon became mixed up with, the question of religion, and no state was either
too great or too little to feel directly or indirectly more or less its influence.52
With slight variations in emphasis, the religious interpretation of the Thirty Years’
War held sway from roughly the end of the conflict until the latter part of the twentieth
century. For example, the Cambridge History of Christianity sums up the view that both
the cause and the settlement of the conflict was, at its core, religious: “The Thirty Years’
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War (1618-1648), being in part a war of religion, made it clear that a better and more
comprehensive settlement than the Peace of Augsburg was needed. The Peace of
Westphalia (1648) which ended the war was … a fundamentally religious settlement.”53
Again, while some variation was present, this view continued.
Another important study, which left the religious view intact but also began
widening the examination of its causes, is C.V. Wedgwood’s 1938 treatment of the
conflict, The Thirty Years War. In this work she clearly proclaimed the centrality of
religion in the conflict. For instance, in commenting on the fact that its origins were in
religion and its effects devastated religious belief, she wrote: “After the expenditure of so
much human life to so little purpose, men might have grasped the essential futility of
pitting the beliefs of the mind to the judgment of the sword. Instead, they rejected
religion as an object to fight for and found others.”54 However, Wedgwood also began to
widen the scope of examination. In examining the religious causes she paid special
attention to the militant and political nature of Calvinism and the role it played in the
conflict.55 Additionally, while emphasizing the German situation, she also began to
emphasize the power struggles between France, England, Spain, and Germany.
Consciously or not, scholarship in the latter part of the twentieth century has
tended to move further down the road Wedgwood began to travel and embrace nonreligious causation for the conflict. An instance of this trend is the very important
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scholarship put forward by a team of academics under the guidance of Geoffrey Parker in
The Thirty Years’ War, now in its second, updated edition. Parker and the other writers
examined the conflict from nearly every possible angle and emphasized several factors:
the Habsburg monarchy and its problems, the paralysis of the Imperial institutions, and
the growing economic issues highlighted by monarchical debt.56 Parker’s treatment does
not overlook religion. Nevertheless, it tended to view even the religious causes of the war
as relating to difficulties with the succession and election of new Habsburg monarchs.57
Continuing the trend away from viewing the war as centrally religious was
Richard Bonney: “The Thirty Years’ War began as a religious war … [but] developed
into a political contest that saw the Austrian Habsburg rulers of the Holy Roman Empire
seeking to expand their control in Europe, while a number of other powers (such as
Sweden) tried to limit their ambitions.”58 This line of thinking has been taken even
further by Hans Medick and Benjamin Marschke. While not dismissing religious factors
entirely, they have commented, “The Thirty Years’ War has often been referred to as the
last of the religious wars. This characterization is problematic for several reasons. On
both sides of the religious divide, rulers made decisions based on secular dynastic
interests, international relations, and constitutional politics.”59 As the move away from
viewing the war as essentially religious has gained traction, the issues of Habsburg rule
and the Imperial constitution have begun to be emphasized. Stephen J. Lee, for example,
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represents the view of many that the Thirty Years’ War was, at its core, a
constitutional/electoral crisis which was exacerbated along confessional lines.60
A survey of the scholarship regarding the war would not be complete, though,
without referencing the prolific writings and strong viewpoint of Peter H. Wilson. The
G.F. Grant Professor of History at the University of Hull is the chief proponent of the
drive toward viewing the Thirty Years’ War as a constitutional conflict of the “Holy
Roman Empire of the German Nation.” In his nearly 1000-page study of the war, Wilson
has asserted two points of particular importance. First, he stated that though the event was
extremely complex, its various parts should be connected “through their common
relationship to the imperial constitution.”61 Second, while not dismissing religion entirely
he has rejected religious causes as being central.62
Critique and Reassertion of the Link to Corpus Christianum
It would be unfair and disingenuous to pretend that there were not significant
imperial problems which played a part in fomenting the Thirty Years’ War. In fact, in a
conflict that was often confusing, even to contemporaries living through it, it would be
the height of modern hubris to declare that an absolutely definitive interpretation of the
origins of the war is possible.63 Nonetheless, as this thesis has argued, the newer
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interpretations which have tended to sideline religious causes, while pointing out valuable
issues, have also overstated the case. Below is a brief critique of the overall trend toward
minimizing religious causes, along with specific points that argue against this tendency.
N. M. Sutherland has written, “No historian of the Thirty Years’ War has paid
systematic attention to its origins. Most have contented themselves with taking the
imperial civil war as the real starting-point.”64 It is the opinion of this author that she is
largely correct. Thus, this work has given systematic attention to the origins and
outworking of Corpus Christianum up to the eruption of hostilities in 1618. Failure to
recognize the overarching religio-social, political framework of Christendom has led to a
devaluing of the religious causes, a position that is unwarranted. The war’s origins lie in
the revision and fracturing of Christendom precipitated by the radical events of the
Protestant Reformation. The Thirty Years’ War represented the final attempt to
reformulate and appropriate the model of Corpus Christianum.65
Additionally, while there were significant political challenges within the electoral
system for Habsburg succession (economic and military disparity between princes, issues
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of language and culture in the respective territories of the electoral kingdoms, etc.), these
were largely nullified by the Oñate Agreement of 1617. This compact clarified the role of
the Spanish and German branches of the House of Habsburg and streamlined the
succession of Ferdinand II to the throne. However, the religious question surrounding the
leadership of Corpus Christianum was still unresolved. This question became especially
significant as the Calvinistic-Reformed vision for Christendom became ascendant in the
important electoral region of the Palatinate, as well as in Bohemia, prior to the war. The
Bohemian Rebellion of 1618 was the flashpoint for the outbreak of wider hostilities.
Even on a popular level, the issues generated by the Reformation were decidedly
religious. As Wedgwood remarked, “The generation which preceded the Thirty Years’
War may not have been more virtuous than its predecessors, but it was certainly more
devout.”66 Her statement holds no little importance in grasping the religious situation of
the populace. It is argued by some scholars that the Reformation and CounterReformation actually evangelized the general population, which, while participating in
the Roman Catholic Church’s sacramental system, did not necessarily have strong
confessional tendencies. For example, Kaspar von Greyerz includes a quote by the
French historian Jean Delameau on this point: “[O]n the eve of the Reformation, the
average European was only superficially Christianized. Under these conditions, the two
reforms, that of Luther and that of Rome, were in the end merely two ostensibly
competing, though in the final analyses converging, processes of Christianizing the
masses and spiritualizing religious sensibilities.”67 An additional example of this idea is
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seen in Marc R. Forster’s assertion that the Tridentine attempts at (re)Catholicization
which had grown in intensity prior to the Thirty Years’ War were actually efforts to
convert generational Protestants to the Roman Catholic faith. Whatever the case, the
issues brought out by the Protestant Reformation were unresolved, and at both the
aristocratic and popular level, religion became central. In this climate, Christians were
anxious to assert either a Protestant or Roman Catholic identity for the reunification of
Corpus Christianum.
Finally, the pressure being applied by the Habsburg monarchy and its staunchly
Roman Catholic vision for Christendom had heightened the tensions in the Holy Roman
Empire. This was especially true for the Emperor Ferdinand II: “His Catholic convictions
amounted … to ‘a consuming passion.’ Convinced that he had a divine mission to
reconvert the Habsburg dominions to Catholicism, he had already imposed ‘confessional
absolutism’ on his own province of Styria.”68 It was his intent to do the same in Bohemia,
something the strongly Calvinistic Christians there could not abide. Again, this was a
religious issue. The partitions and challenges left over from a once-united, now-divided
Christendom were “turning up the heat” in the German lands. The Peace of Augsburg
could not and would not hold.
As this study moves forward into an overview of the struggle itself, the essentially
religious nature of the conflict’s origins will be seen even more clearly. This was
particularly the case in the first half of the Thirty Years’ War from the Bohemian Revolt
to the death of the Swedish king, Gustavus Adolphus (1618-1632). As the survey of the
proceeds into the second half (1634-1648) it will be seen, though, that the war eventually
undermined religion and became a pan-European war waged over increasingly
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secularized, nationalistic motivations. From there, a move toward dissecting the effects of
the Thirty Years’ War will be effectively launched. We now turn to an examination of the
war in an effort to emphasize its major battles and developments.
The Thirty Years’ War, Part One: 1618-1632
The Bohemian Revolt and Aftermath (1618-1623)
Although tensions were running high after the Donauwӧrth Incident in 1607 and
the formations of the Protestant Union and Catholic League, they were soon eased.
Rudolph’s Letter of Majesty, followed by his successor, Matthias’s, relatively benign rule
led many to believe that a period of religious toleration in accord with the Augsburg
Peace would recommence. This was not to be the case. With Matthias’ appointment of
his Jesuit-trained, ardently Catholic nephew, Ferdinand II, as his successor it was merely
a matter of time before conflict would arise. This became a foregone conclusion as
Ferdinand was crowned King of Bohemia in June of 1617. As King of Styria, Ferdinand
II had enacted aggressive (re)Catholicization efforts. There was every reason to believe
that he would do the same in Bohemia. As Helfferich comments: “It was an open secret
that Ferdinand agreed to uphold the Bohemian Letter of Majesty only in order to gain the
Bohemian crown, and once named as king-designate, he immediately began a systematic
attempt to suppress both Protestantism and the local estates in his territories.”69 These
attempts included censorship, the deposing of Protestant officials, and a reversal of
religious policies determined under previous agreements.
This situation was untenable, and on May 23, 1618 the so-called Defenestration of
Prague launched the Thirty Years’ War. In this incident, two representatives of King
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Ferdinand, along with one of their secretaries, were thrown out of a 70-foot-high window
in Prague Castle. Miraculously they survived. However, the fragile peace in the German
lands did not. Events moved quickly as the rebels declared Ferdinand II to be deposed as
their king. In his stead, they placed the Bohemian crown on Frederick V, Elector of the
Palatinate. Frederick, a devout Calvinist-Protestant and powerful prince of the Palatinate,
was only 23 years old. Despite his passionate Calvinism and the fact that he was “one of
the best-connected princes in Protestant Europe,”70 Frederick turned out to be a very
weak leader. He was not only unable to effectively organize the military but he also
struggled to make alliances and gain support. He was prodded on by some of his
staunchest allies, particularly Prince Christian of Anhalt-Bernberg. In the end, though,
even potential allies such as his father-in-law, King James I of England, were not willing
to enter into the conflict on his behalf.
The situation for Frederick and the Bohemian rebels quickly deteriorated. In
1619, Ferdinand II officially took hold of the title of Holy Roman Emperor from his
uncle, Matthias. This was critical, for although the Bohemian rebels had deposed him as
their king, the title and rights of Emperor allowed him to assert legal claims to the throne
and to undermine the statesmanship of Frederick. Additionally, the Spanish Habsburg
forces invaded Frederick’s territories in the Lower Palatinate and undermined his ability
to utilize his title and strength in his native electoral region. By the first major battle of
the war, at White Mountain (5 miles outside of Prague) on November 8, 1620, the
situation for the Bohemians was bleak. Though the military numbers were roughly
equivalent, Ferdinand’s forces were guided by the experienced Catholic League
commanders, Maximilian of Bavaria and Johannes Tserklaes, Count of Tilly. By contrast,
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Frederick’s forces were not seasoned and his Upper Palatinate minister, Prince Christian
of Anhalt-Bernburg, was not of the quality of Tilly or Maximilian. Within hours, the
rebel forces were crushed and Prague was opened to the onslaught of the ImperialBavarian army. Maximilian offered immunity to those who fled. However, rebel leaders
who stayed were hunted down and killed. Frederick V was forced to flee back to his
Palatinate lands and abdicated the Bohemian throne.71
Using the Palatinate as his base of operations, Frederick sought over the next
three years to regain his foothold and make gains. Unfortunately for him, his forces
absorbed one defeat after another. By August of 1623 he had lost everything and was
forced to flee to the United Provinces (the Netherlands). In February of 1624,
Ferdinand II officially deposed Frederick as Elector of the Palatinate.
The decisive defeat of the Calvinist-Protestant rebels, along with the
unwillingness of the remaining Lutheran princes of the Protestant Union to support the
failed leadership of Frederick should have ended the conflict. However, for three reasons
it continued and exploded into a wider war after 1624. First, pockets of resistance in the
Upper and Rhine Palatinate refused to give up and held out for years. Second, the
Spanish Habsburg forces moved into the Rhine Palatinate to prepare for further war with
their former (United Provinces) and current (Spanish Netherlands) Dutch lands. A
twelve-year truce from 1609-1621 had kept the peace. Now, Spanish intervention
exacerbated Protestant and Catholic tensions. Third, and finally, The Lutheran king of
Denmark, Christian IV, who owned many lands in northern Germany, became convinced
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that he must intervene for the Protestant cause and for his territory. This would set up the
next phase of the war (1625-1629).
Again, it is important to note that this first phase of the Thirty Years’ War was
decidedly religious. Territorial gains and political strategy certainly played a part.
Nonetheless, the aggressive (re)Catholicization of Ferdinand II coupled with the
diametrically opposed Calvinist-Protestant vision for Corpus Christianum found in
Bohemia and the Palatinate was the major factor in the war. A further corroboration of
the centrality of religious causation was found in the popular view of the time. This
assessment was that the conflict represented God’s judgment on the sinfulness of
Christendom. The famous diary of the shoemaker Hans Heberle, Zeytregister, ensconced
this perspective. In a 1630 re-write of his diary’s 1618 introduction, he commented on the
religious import of the war and an associated astral event:
Anno 1618, a great comet appeared in the form of a great and terrible rod through
and by which God threatened us mightily because of our sinful lives, which we
fully deserved and continue to deserve daily. … What it meant and what would
follow thereafter [the war] causes one to cry hot tears … Anno 1619, Ferdinand II
became the [Holy] Roman Emperor, under whom a great persecution happened
through war, unrest, and the spilling of the blood of Christians … First he started
a big war in Bohemia, which he then oppressed under his religion.72
From the Emperor to the “man on the street,” the beginning of the Thirty Years’
War was widely viewed as being religiously centered. When this popular view of the
conflict’s contemporaries is examined and set in the context of Corpus Christianum, it
becomes clear that the religious origins of the war should not be dismissed in the more
secularized climate of contemporary scholarship.
The Danish Phase (1624-1629)
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Significant effort was spent to frame the beginning phase of the war as essentially
religious. As this examination moves forward, it will be argued that this continued to be
the case in the Danish phase, despite two surprising twists; one made by the Lutheran
king of Denmark, Christian IV, and the other by Ferdinand II. Both of these players, in an
effort to curtail the conflict, would focus their attention around the agreement which had
allowed Christendom in the Holy Roman Empire to limp along, the Peace of Augsburg
(1555). However, their application of the Augsburg agreement differed greatly, with
Ferdinand’s action almost guaranteeing that religious conflict would continue.
With his resounding defeat at the hands of the Imperial-Bavarian army,
Frederick V was deposed and exiled. However, his remaining allies in the Palatinate, as
well as his father-in-law in England, sought to put pressure on King Christian IV of
Denmark to rise to the defense of the Protestant cause. Initially, the Dane was somewhat
reluctant to do so. Nonetheless, he was also alarmed at the aggressive (re)Catholicization
being implemented by Ferdinand II. After some deliberation, Christian declared his
intention to come to the aid of the Protestants in a letter (February 21, 1626) to the
archbishops and electors of the northern German lands. However, in a surprising twist, he
also sought to make clear that his desire was not to outlaw Roman Catholicism but,
instead, to return the large part of Christendom represented by the “Holy Roman Empire
of the German Nation,” to the compromise position of the Peace of Augsburg:
[W]e were inclined toward peace … and wished to be excused before God and the
world for all of the judgments and bloodletting that would ensue. … [However] in
order to save this circle [i.e., defensive alliance in northern electorates] … and to
save German liberty, which is everywhere suffering, we joined with them in a
confederation so that thereby, with the grace of God the Almighty, liberty and the
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Religious and Secular Peace [of 1555] might not be lost, but conserved through
those means allowed by God and nature.73
Despite his somewhat lengthy deliberations about becoming involved in the fight,
King Christian was initially very confident he would succeed. However, Emperor
Ferdinand II had not been idle in the wake of his initial victories during the Bohemian
rebellion and the Palatinate phase of the war. Desiring an army that would be under direct
Imperial control without any constraints from the Catholic League, Ferdinand had
negotiated with his general Albrecht von Wallenstein and had authorized him to raise an
army of some 25,000 troops. Wallenstein was an adept recruiter and negotiator as well as
an impressive military commander. The force he raised would prove to be decisive in the
Danish phase of the war. Though Wallenstein suffered some minor setbacks, his army
crushed the Danish forces on September 2, 1628 in the Battle of Wolgast. Christian IV
was forced to take refuge by ship and return to Denmark. By 1629, he had negotiated
with Ferdinand for peace and withdrawn entirely from the war.
While this turn of events could have, once again, ended the conflict, Ferdinand II
would make a move that guaranteed further bloodshed. Ferdinand – under the advice of
his hawkish, Jesuit confessor Lamormaini – would issue the fateful Edict of Restitution.
In this decree, Ferdinand also appealed to the Peace of Augsburg, albeit in a very
different way than Christian IV. First, his dictate sought to reverse the gains made by
Lutherans in claiming church property through their former refusal to abide by the
controversial “Ecclesiastical Reservation” in the Augsburg peace. Also, Ferdinand’s
order outlawed Calvinism and any sect that was not Roman Catholic or adhered to the
Augsburg Confession (i.e., Lutheran). Two brief excerpts from the Edict of Restitution
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help to illustrate the untenable religio-political situation that was introduced through this
decree. First, the attack on Lutherans through the retroactive enforcement of the
Ecclesiastical Reservation:
Thus we are finally resolved, for the genuine implementation of the Secular and
Religious Peace, to delegate forthwith our imperial commissioners to go into the
empire; to reclaim from their illegal holders those archbishoprics and bishoprics,
prelatures, cloisters, and other ecclesiastical property, hospitals, and foundations
that the Catholics possessed at the time of the Treaty of Passau [1552].74
Next, the devastating blow to the Calvinist-Reformed Protestants, especially those who
had sided with Frederick V:
We also hereby … declare and recognize that the Religious Peace concerns and
includes only those of the ancient Catholic religion and the adherents of the
unaltered Augsburg Confession, as it was presented to our beloved ancestor
Emperor Charles V in the year 1530 on the 25th of June. All other contrary
doctrines and sects, of whatever name and whether they have already arisen or are
still to arise, shall be impermissible, excluded from the peace, forbidden, and
neither tolerated nor suffered.75
With the above diktat, Ferdinand had once again shown that he had no intention of
allowing for Protestantism to have an equal footing in the life of Corpus Christianum.
This decree would raise the ire of many in the Holy Roman Empire and precipitated the
next phase of the war, the intervention by Sweden under the command of the “Lion of the
North,” Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden.
As with the earlier Bohemian and Palatinate phases of the war, the Danish
intervention can be seen as a decidedly religious endeavor. Perhaps more than any
personality in the war, Christian IV seemed to have had pure motives. He did seek to
“save” the Protestant cause, although not to the exclusion of Catholic worship and
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freedom. The Danish king, in fact, seemed content to live within the tension of a
reformulated Christendom under the terms of the Peace of Augsburg. Christian IV was
moved toward the conflict, inexorably, by the designs of the Protestants in England and
the Calvinists supporting Frederick V. There were religious causes at root in this stage of
the war even if political opportunism was also at play. Again, the controlling issue at this
point of the war was still to decide the shape of the religio-social, political reality of
Corpus Christianum.
For the Roman Catholic Habsburgs, the motives at this stage were also decidedly
religious – especially for Ferdinand II and his Jesuit advisors. The Edict of Restitution
was a decidedly pro-Catholic, religiously motivated, power grab. It fit the pattern of
Ferdinand’s rule – a pattern exhibited since his first moves as King of Styria. Ferdinand,
like the other Habsburg princes and monarchs, was self-consciously Catholic and
determined to restore the proper order of Corpus Christianum to its rightful Roman
Catholic foundation. Ironically, however, Ferdinand’s decree set the stage for drawing in
Swedish military might under King Gustavus Adolphus. This led to renewal of the
Protestant cause as well as the unseating of the important imperial general, Albrecht von
Wallenstein.
Swedish Intervention (1630-1635)
With the official entrance of Sweden into the fighting, the Thirty Years’ War
began to take on a decidedly international character. At this point in the conflict, one can
see the ever-widening scope of the war. Standing on one side and representing most of
the Roman Catholic powers in Europe were the pro-Habsburg powers of Spain and the
Holy Roman Empire, along with Italian and papal elements. On the other side were those
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aligned with the pro-Protestant elements in Germany and Bohemia along with the Swedes
who enjoyed Franco-Dutch support (indirectly through financial payments, and directly
through military alliances against Spanish and Italian interests).
Despite this, it is the opinion of this author that the conflict at this point still
remained a battle for the shape of a united Corpus Christianum. This can be seen
especially in the larger-than-life figure, King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden. It is true
that Geoffrey Parker, in citing Adolphus’ war declaration from June 1630 does state the
following: “There was no mention at all of what Sweden hoped to gain by her
intervention, nor of any desire to save the Protestant cause from extinction at the hands of
Imperial troops.”76 Additionally, the important statesman, Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna
of Sweden, steadfastly maintained that there was no distinct religious purpose behind
Sweden’s involvement. However, a wider look at Protestant sentiment during this stage
of the war, as well as a look at the character and aims of Gustavus, will show, once again,
that the war continued to be decidedly religious in character.
Swedish involvement in the war was begun and expanded by a combination of
factors. First, King Gustavus was clearly in the crosshairs of Imperial expansionism. As
the Danish threat from Christian IV quickly came to naught, Albrecht von Wallenstein –
with pressure from the Emperor, Spain, and France – had begun to march north toward
the Baltic Sea. The army of Wallenstein occupied large areas of Pomerania, making the
invasion of Sweden for Imperial gain a distinct possibility. It became quite clear that this
was the plan when Wallenstein put Straslund (northern Pomeranian city ideal for
launching a naval invasion of Sweden) under siege. Straslund held, but the
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counteroffensive launched from there by Christian IV would lead to his destruction at the
aforementioned Battle of Wolgast.
This would lead to the second factor bringing Sweden into the war, the direct
intervention of Wallenstein and Ferdinand II in the Swedish conflict against Poland.
Geoffrey Parker sums up the situation well: “[Christian IV’s defeat] left Wallenstein free
to loan 12,000 of his troops to the emperor’s brother-in-law, Sigismund of Poland, who
had been fighting off a Swedish invasion since 1625.”77 This intervention nearly led to
the death of Gustavus and the destruction of his army at the Battle of Honigfelde on June
27, 1629.
The third factor followed Gustavus’ near demise. He escaped and retired from
Poland just in time to receive a French envoy sent by the crafty Cardinal Richelieu.
Richelieu and France, seeking to undermine Habsburg power (to be seen in more detail
later), had sought, to no avail, to co-opt Maximilian of Bavaria as an ally against
Ferdinand. Additionally, France had sought to persuade Christian IV to continue the
Protestant war effort, again to no avail. However, in a complex agreement worked out
between Sweden and Poland-Lithuania, Richelieu’s envoy, Hercule de Charnacé, was
able to broker peace and extract Gustavus from Poland. Upon brokering this peace (the
Truce of Almark), Gustavus was persuaded to enter into the fray in the German lands.
Once Gustavus invaded, a final factor helped convince the King of Sweden to
expand his military involvement: the dismissal of Wallenstein. Albrecht von Wallenstein
had proven himself an able general and a crafty alliance-maker. However, reaction to the
problems caused by Ferdinand’s overreach in the Edict of Restitution combined with
alarm at Wallenstein’s growing power, led a group of Imperial Catholic electors to act.
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Richard Bonney sums up these developments well: “At their electoral meeting at
Regensburg in August 1630, they forced the dismissal of Waldstein [Wallensein] as
Imperial generalissimo, refused to elect Frederick II’s son as king of the Romans
(apparently questioning the Habsburg automatic right of succession to the Imperial title)
and, most significantly, reduced the size of the Imperial army.”78 Command of the armies
of the Catholic and the Holy Roman Empire shifted to Count Tilly. Due to this confusion
in the Imperial forces, King Gustavus Adolphus, the “Lion of the North,” was able to
make swift and steady progress through Germany from 1630 until early 1631. By January
of 1631, the northern city of Magdeburg, which was seeking to break free from the grip
of Ferdinand’s (re)Catholicization, had become Sweden’s operational base.
The Protestant cause seemed once again ascendant, but at this very moment the
war would take a brutal turn. The Thirty Years’ War up to this juncture had already been
a fierce and bloody affair, with much suffering among the soldiery and peasantry alike.
However, on “20 May 1631 … the army of the Catholic League, under Tilly and
Pappenheim, captured and sacked Magdeburg, in what constituted the single worst
atrocity of the war and certainly the event that was most widely recorded. Practically the
whole city was destroyed by fire and 24,000 men, women and children are said to have
died.”79 The city was subjected to not only the fire, but the burning hatred and resentment
of the Catholic armies. A contemporary eyewitness clearly believed the murder, rape, and
pillage of the event to be, at least in part, religiously motivated: “Thus it happened that
the city, with all of its inhabitants, fell into the hands and under the power of its enemies,
whose fierceness and cruelty came partly out of a common hatred of the adherents of the
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Augsburg Confession.”80 The Sack of Magdeburg marked a transition point toward
increased cruelty and violence, especially against non-combatants.
After this setback, the Protestants armies of Sweden and its allies were motivated
to avenge the deeds done at Magdeburg. This vengeance would come quickly in an
important victory for the Protestants at the First Battle of Breitenfeld on September 17,
1631. This was the largest battle of the war in sheer numbers of troops and artillery. The
Saxon-Swedish army numbered between 39-42,000 infantry and cavalry against a force
of 31-37,000 under Tilly and the joint Catholic League-Imperial army. This battle was a
smashing victory for the Protestant forces, with Tilly losing somewhere between onethird to two-thirds of his army. This victory virtually guaranteed that the war would
continue unabated for years to come. The Protestant cause was emboldened, yet the
Catholic cause was not fully undone. More bloodshed would be sure to come.
The events of Breitenfeld also illustrate the continued, strongly religious view of
the war among its participants at this juncture. The victory had raised the hopes of
Protestant leaders for total victory against the Catholics and a new era for Corpus
Christianum under Lutheran and/or Reformed dominance. In a letter from the Protestant
ruler, Landgrave William V of Hesse-Cassel, to Gustavus Adolphus this emphasis can be
clearly seen. William V asserted in the letter that the conflict had always been a religious
struggle: “[T]he primary cause of the arming of the Evangelicals was freedom of
conscience.”81 Additionally, he called for the complete removal of Imperial or papal
influence regarding interpretation of the Augsburg Confession, and by extension, the
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Peace of Augsburg. Finally, he echoed other calls for vengeance against Roman
Catholics: “Finally … 1) … the Catholics should be completely and totally disarmed …
3) That on account of the damages we have sustained, and just as they intended to do
with us, the papists, must pay Your Royal Majesty and us Evangelicals with their lands
and people.”82 William’s sentiments resonated well with a Protestant military and
populace that had suffered greatly under (re)Catholicization and fourteen years of
Catholic military dominance up to this point in the conflict. Religious factors were still
dominant.
Additionally, the warrant for continuing to call the Thirty Years’ War a religious
conflict through this stage can be taken from looking at the figure of Gustavus Adolphus
himself. Due to his Calvinist upbringing and his strong distaste for the Catholic mass,
Gustavus was firmly a Protestant (though, more Lutheran than Reformed in his
sensibilities). Additionally, there is little doubt that Gustavus viewed his entire life’s
mission as emanating from a divine call. He had (seemingly miraculously) survived many
military incidents in his life, and he had taken these, along with his father’s sense of
divine providence as marking out his life’s path:
Such episodes reinforced his faith in divine providence and belief that he was
doing God’s will. Later writers, like the philosopher Hegel, took the king at his
word and interpreted him as an instrument of world spirit, destined to unfold
history. Gustavus grew up with his father’s propaganda that linked the Vasas’ [the
royal house of Sweden to which Gustavus belonged] dynastic struggle to the
Protestant cause. He [Gustavus] appears to have sincerely believed that these two
interests were genuinely the same.83
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Further evidence of this was the way in which Gustavus’ military was very strictly
governed with respect to religious devotion and discipline.84 Despite the growing political
motivations of some European powers – particularly France – the conflict up through this
stage remained one in which committed Protestants and Catholics continued to fight for
the soul of Corpus Christianum.
The Protestant hopes for Christendom were now pinned on the “Lion of the
North.” Emboldened by success at Breitenfeld and convinced of the favor of God,
Gustavus and the French-backed, Swedish-German armies pressed forward. Throughout
the remainder of 1631 and well into 1632, they liberated Protestant areas from Imperial
control and the oppressive yoke of the Edict of Restitution. Gustavus pushed through the
territories of Franconia and Thuringia and down the Main and Rhine river valleys. He retook the Lower Palatinate and marched into the electorate of Mainz. Here, the Swedish
army built a “vast military camp, called Gustavusburg, as the base for his conquering
army.”85 Spirits were high. However, at the height of his power in the German lands,
Gustavus and the Protestant cause began to falter. Alarmed at the rapid march of the
Swedish armies, Ferdinand II recalled the deposed Albrecht von Wallenstein. This
proved to be a key factor in the undoing of Adolphus and in the lengthening of the war.
The building of a confined military camp (Gustavusburg) also proved to be disastrous.
The cutting of supply lines by Wallenstein coupled with outbreaks of disease in the
crowded Swedish encampment brought about a swift reduction in the Swedish numbers.
Additionally, Wallenstein dispersed his troops into smaller units to combat his army’s
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own struggles with illness and supply. Bonney credits the above conditions with setting
the stage for the still-large yet greatly-reduced forces (18,000 for Wallenstein and
approximately 19,000 for Gustavus) which would engage at the Battle of Lützen on
November 16, 1632. The battle was largely indecisive except for one crucial event: the
death of King Gustavus Adolphus. This threw the Protestant, Swedish-led army into
disarray and decisively turned the conflict from a religious war into a European civil war,
with Franco-Spanish tensions and full-scale French engagement driving another decade
and a half of brutal, scorched-earth bloodshed. Setback after setback for the Protestant
armies would continue until 1634.
The Thirty Years’ War, Part Deux: 1634-1648
French Intervention and Secularization of the Conflict (1634/5-1648)
After two years of steady setbacks and slackening morale among the SwedishProtestant militants, the Imperial forces appeared to be gaining the upper hand. However,
a seeming “ray of light” for the Protestants came on February 25, 1634 as the everscheming, always-powerful, yet never-trusted generalissimo Albrecht von Wallenstein
was assassinated due to his attempts to broker a peace with Saxony, Brandenburg, and
Sweden behind Ferdinand II’s back. Wallenstein was a pivotal figure in the early success
of the Habsburg-Catholic cause. Nevertheless, his loyalties were often in question: “The
complexity of his character makes him more difficult to categorize than any of his
contemporaries; he seems to have been part-mercenary, part-diplomat, and part-political
aspirant.”86 Whatever, the case, Ferdinand II sent a group of foreign mercenaries to end
the career and life of Albrecht von Wallenstein.
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This seemed to provide an opening for the Swedish-Protestant army. After
Gustavus’ demise, the overall command of his forces was handed to Bernard of SaxeWeimar. Bernard was not as gifted as King Adolphus, but he proved to be a somewhat
steadying influence. Still, despite Wallenstein’s death and the Protestant stabilization, the
Imperial-Catholic cause appeared to be near victory. Ferdinand III (the son of the
Emperor) was given the overall command of the Imperial forces after Wallenstein’s
demise and was initially very effective. Additionally, his cousin, Fernando, CardinalInfante of Spain, increased the presence and importance of Spain in the conflict. At the
First Battle of Nӧrdlingen on September 6, 1634, the Imperial-Catholic army, with the
united forces of the Spanish and Germano-Austrian Habsburg lines, delivered a crushing
defeat to the Protestant forces. Total victory for the Imperial forces seemed close at hand.
It might have been if not for the full-scale involvement of France which came to
dominate the second half of the Thirty Years’ War. For years, the French minister
Armand-Jean du Plessis, Cardinal de Richelieu, had been the driving force of French
policy under Louis XIII. In agreements with the United Provinces (a Spanish enemy, the
northern Netherlands), through the Truce of Almark (which brought Sweden formally
into the war), and in general attempts to undermine the Germano-Austrian Habsburgs and
Spanish Habsburgs, Richilieu and France had proven themselves to be Catholic, yes, but
also the most “political” (in the more modern, secular sense) of all the groups involved in
the Thirty Years’ War. However, France had largely been content to work the angles
behind the scenes. This would change quickly and dramatically after tensions with its
long-term enemy, Spain, were re-sparked on March 26, 1635. Utilizing its position in the
Spanish Netherlands, the Spaniards attacked the city of Trier in the Palatinate and then
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captured its French-allied protector, Christoph von Sӧtern. This incident would bring
France into the war in a formal capacity.
The French involvement would come to dominate and unleashed a period where
the Thirty Years’ War became increasingly secularized. Franco-Spanish tensions,
mercenary armies, and national-linguistic-regional-state concerns became the dominant
factors in the conflict. The Thirty Years’ War was no longer centrally religious, but
increasingly developed into a secular, pan-European war. From 1635 through 1648, the
Franco-Swedish, mercenary-laden alliance fought the Habsburg partners (Ferdinand II,
his successor Ferdinand III, and Spain) and, in the process, utterly ravaged the German
lands. Gustavus Adolphus’ successor, Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, knowing that the
German Protestant princes were either unable or unwilling to join with the Swedes to
further resist Imperial forces, began to negotiate with France. France successfully became
the dominant player in the region.
Another important aspect to note regarding the entrance of France and the
secularization of the conflict concerned the dealings of Axel Oxenstierna of Sweden. As
previously discussed, Gustavus Adolphus was the pivotal figure in the first half of the
Thirty Years’ War, and he also convinced of a religious, providential direction for his
prosecution of the struggle.87 Yet, it was in cooperation with his trusted Chancellor Axel
Oxenstierna that Gustavus truly set his course, as seen in his famous remark: “if my
ardour did not put some life in your phlegm, we should never get anything done at all.”88
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And, after the king’s death, as Swedish-Protestant forces languished, Oxenstierna’s
“phlegm” was set to work. As the war went increasingly poorly for Sweden in 1633 and
1634, the Swedish minister sought to broker a deal with the French while at the same
time seeking to make peace with Ferdinand II. In the end, France provided the sweeter
deal, and in the Treaty of Hamburg (March 1638), the terms were set: France would pay
to finance the army and would continue the fight against the Imperial forces in the
Rhineland. In return, Sweden would continue the prosecution of the war in the East. With
Spanish aggression having forced their hand and the compact with the Swedes locking
them into the conflict, the designs of the French monarchy under the influence of French
ministers Cardinal Richelieu and later Cardinal Mazarin came to the forefront.
With France’s formal entrance into the war, the Swedish-Protestant forces were
stabilized. Johan Báner, a rising Swedish marshal, supplanted Bernard of Saxe-Weimar
as the commander of the Swedish forces after Bernard’s death and, along with generals
Lennart Tortennson and Alexander Leslie, won a decisive victory over Imperial forces at
the Battle of Wittstock on October 4, 1636. However, just as it again appeared that the
anti-Habsburg armies were winning, setbacks came throughout 1637. These were shortlived, though, and with the solidification of a politically-based, anti-Habsburg alliance
between France and Sweden through the aforementioned Treaty of Hamburg, the
eventual weakening of Imperial power began. Along with France’s renewed capital
support came Oxenstierna’s gift of 14,000 new recruits for Báner from Sweden. This
allowed him to push deeper into German lands, and at the Battle of Chemnitz in Saxony,
on 14 April 1639, Báner inflicted a major defeat on the Imperial army under Archduke
Leopold-William, Ferdinand III’s brother. This opened up the route into Silesia and
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Bohemia and Báner made further advances. In 1640, the forces of Sweden and France
joined their war effort together; meeting at Erfurt, they began pushing into Bavaria.
The death of Báner on May 20, 1641 was a momentary setback. This led to a
mutiny among the Swedish forces – many of whom were mercenaries that had not been
receiving their pay. However, by November of 1641, the army stabilized as Tortennson,
Gustavus’ artillery commander and Báner’s right-hand man, was appointed by
Chancellor Oxenstierna as the head of the Swedish forces. After some minor gains and
victories, Tortennson, though outnumbered, won a significant victory at the Second
Battle of Breitenfeld on November 2, 1642. Additionally, in a further illustration of the
growing irreligiousness of the war, Tortennson defeated a Danish army (LutheranProtestants) as they sought to re-enter the war in 1644, this time as allies of the proCatholic Imperial Forces.
With a few setbacks, the final stretch of the war moved closer. French forces
devastated a Spanish force of 18,000 men at the Battle of Rocroi on 19 May 1643. Joint
Franco-Weimar forces suffered a small setback on 24 November 1643 at the Battle of
Tuttlingen which briefly emboldened the Imperial forces and led Maximilian of Bavaria
to call upon Emperor Ferdinand III for reinforcements. However, in 1645, Tortennson
resolutely reclaimed the areas of Bohemia and Moravia which were lost in the Danish reincursion into the war. At the Battle of Jankow on 6 March 1645, Tortennson dealt a
devastating defeat to the Imperial forces and began marching toward Vienna, the
Austrian capital. Emperor Ferdinand III fled to Graz. From this point, the Imperial
position continued to weaken.
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The gains in the East by the Swedish army were not initially replicated by the
French armies in the West. The French general Henri Turenne suffered losses in the early
part of 1645. However, joining together with Louis II de Bourbon, Prince de Condé (the
Great Condé), Turenne crushed the Imperial Army at the Second Battle of Nӧrdlingen on
6 August 1645. After this devastating loss, the Imperial forces, particularly those fielded
by Maximilian of Bavaria, were stretched to the limit. At this point, the Swedish under
Tortennson and Wrangel, along with the French under Turenne joined forces. This was
mildly objected to by the French minister Cardinal Mazarin because the Swedish
commanders, particularly the dominating figure of Karl Gustav Wrangel, were proud and
unpopular figures who threatened the French. Mazarin was wary of ceding the French
army to the control of what was now a superior Swedish force. However, Turenne,
though French, was a Huguenot, and as a Calvinist had a strong desire to crush the
Catholic Emperor in addition to undermining Habsburg power. The joint Franco-Swedish
force quickly cut off the Bavarian forces under Archduke Leopold-William. By August
19, 1646 Maximilian of Bavaria was forced to flee to Munich. From there, he opened up
negotiations and in the Treaty of Ulm (March 14, 1647) negotiated between France,
Sweden, and Bavaria he abandoned his alliance with Ferdinand III.
Maximilian broke the Treaty of Ulm and shifted back into alliance with
Ferdinand III in September of 1647. It was to no avail. A final consolidation of the
Swedish and French armies set the stage for the almost complete annihilation of the
Imperial-Bavarian military at the Battle of Zusmarshausen on May 17, 1648. Finally, the
Thirty Years’ War would come to a close. The last major battle of the war was the Battle
of Prague which commenced on July 26, 1648 when Swedish general Hans Christoff von
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Kӧnigsmarck was able to enter a portion of the city and recapture Prague Castle. This
brought the conflict full-circle, to the very location where the Defenestration of Prague
and Bohemian Rebellion had, thirty years prior, launched the devastation. The Swedish
forces were unable to take the entire city and, shortly thereafter, the series of treaties
negotiated at Osnabrück and Münster in Westphalia were signed and ratified, becoming
completed in October of 1648 and known collectively as the Peace of Westphalia.
The final half of the war was dizzying in its pace and the alliances it engendered.
It was increasingly fought for secularized reasons, despite having a religious veneer.
Catholic France united with the Dutch-Reformed United Provinces against Catholic
(though Habsburg) Spain. Additionally, France led the victory charge for Protestantism
with Sweden – against the Catholic power of the Habsburgs in Germany. Denmark had
been the Protestant standard-bearer for a time from 1625-1629; however, she entered the
fray against her fellow Lutherans in 1644. While the period from 1618-1632 certainly
included some territorial motivations, it was the second half of the war under French
ascendancy that transformed the conflict into a secularized venture. With the weakened
situation in Germany after the first half of the war, it was perhaps to be expected that
powers with colonial designs would seek to fill the vacuum of power. As part three is
ended, we will next shift attention to the aftermath of the war. What will be seen is that
the Thirty Years’ War – always vicious and devastating – will prove to have sown the
seeds for the undoing of Corpus Christianum and the undermining of Christianity and
religion in the Western World.
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PART 3
THE END OF THE THIRTY YEARS’ WAR AND
THE AFTERMATH FOR CORPUS CHRISTIANUM
Friedrich Schiller surmised that the turn from religious motivation toward
political power-grabbing could be seen even prior to France’s formal involvement in the
figure of the Swedish hero, Gustavus Adolphus. Schiller remarked, “[I]t was no longer
the benefactor of Germany who fell at Lützen: the beneficent part of his career, Gustavus
Adolphus had already terminated; and now the greatest service which he could render to
the liberties of Germany was – to die. The all-encompassing power of an individual was
at an end.”89 Schiller’s words could, and perhaps more aptly, should be applied to
religion as practiced and conceived in Corpus Christianum. For, in the aftermath of the
Thirty Years’ War, the “all-encompassing power of religion” in the Western world would
come to a close.
This thesis has argued that religious motivations were central in the Thirty Years’
War’s first half (1618-1632/33) and that the ascendancy of French political motivations
and a colonializing, nation-state brawl came to characterize the conflict’s second period
(1634/35-1648). This can nowhere be seen more clearly than in the Peace of Westphalia
and the effects of the war on the generations following 1648. In order to examine the
results of the conflict for Corpus Christianum, this thesis shall now turn to an assessment
of the Peace of Westphalia, especially its role as a founding charter for secular
government (though it was not a fully secular document). Next, a summary of the
reordering which flowed from Westphalia shall be given. Lastly, a brief look at the
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devastation of the conflict for Germany and Europe will commence, concluding with the
assertion that the true devastation produced by the Thirty Years’ War was the collapse of
Corpus Christianum. From this collapse, the Western world would witness the rise of the
Enlightenment, secularization, and absolute monarchy as Christendom receded.
The Peace of Westphalia
The Peace of Westphalia, which formally ended the Thirty Years’ War, was made
up of two separate treaties.90 The Peace of Osnabrück (Intrsumentum Pacis
Osnabrugense or IPO) formally ended hostilities between the Empire and Sweden and
served as a new Imperial constitution across the Empire. The Peace of Münster
(Instrumentum Pacis Monasteriense or IPM) worked out issues between the Empire and
France, while excluding certain issues such as French occupation of the duchy of
Lorraine. Yet, the Westphalian Settlement was not merely a dividing up of territory.
Instead, it was a religious, political, and territorial compromise which was put forth as a
new Imperial constitution and a definitive statement on the 1555 religious settlement in
the Peace of Augsburg.
The negotiations were highly complex, and the settlement took more than four
years to complete. This complexity has prompted one scholar to remark:
The first peace conference of modern times was a law unto itself. The
negotiations were handled by 176 plenipotentiaries (almost half of them lawyers
by profession) who acted for 194 European rulers, great and small. Not all of the
states represented at the congress sent delegations of their own – only 109 did so
– but nevertheless several thousand diplomatic personnel thronged the streets of
Münster and Osnabrück between 1643 and 1648. The size of the various
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embassies ranged from 200 men, women and children in the French delegation to
the lone envoys of the smaller German principalities.”91
The Peace of Westphalia covered much ground, but can be roughly summarized
as follows. First, it granted a general amnesty for all involved in the violence of the war
(Article II of IPO). Second, it reasserted and defined the right of princes to administer
allocations of church property. Importantly, it stipulated that all allocations would revert
back to their condition on January 1, 1624 (Article V, Sec. 2 & 31 of IPO). This was seen
as a date which would be fair to Roman Catholics while undoing the seizures of the
Empire and Roman Catholic Church in the Edict of Restitution. Third, it undercut the
principle of cuius regio, eius religio set forth in the Peace of Augsburg and located proper
interpretation of the religious peace within the Westphalian settlement itself: “Regarding
the controversial articles in the present treaty, whatever was agreed to by common
consent [at Westphalia] shall be considered a perpetual declaration of the said peace
[i.e., Peace of Augsburg].”92 Fourth, it broadened the religious peace to include
“Reformed” Protestants (Art. VII, Sec. 1 of IPO]. Fifth, it strengthened and “birthed” the
secular idea of private religious principle vs. public life (Article V, Sec. 34). Finally, it
articulated various conditions which would govern the relationships of the powers
involved, and it formally established territorial gains and/or losses from the war.
Each of the above issues was important. However, it was the way that the
Westphalian settlement dealt with religion that particularly stood out. While the Peace of
Westphalia was not a fully secular document, it nonetheless enshrined important
principles that would come to govern Western nations from that point forward. Two of
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these principles, in particular, would represent the establishment of a proto-secular order.
Benjamin Straumann crystallizes the importance of this development: “Westphalia …
established a secular order by taking sovereignty over religious affairs away from the
discretion of territorial princes and by establishing a proto-liberal legal distinction
between private and public affairs.”93 These two issues, along with the declaration that
the once-hated Reformed groups would also share equal legal status in Europe, cemented
the growing importance of nation-states and political entities vis-à-vis religious issues
and the Church.
Nowhere is this move toward favoring nation-state politics over religion seen
more clearly than in the treatment of the papal delegations at the peace proceedings.
Initially, in a very Corpus Christianum-like way, the papal delegation was given a
favored role. However, this was not to last:
When Rome would not sanction any Catholic concessions to the Protestants, or
even to accord them diplomatic recognition, the powers found that they could do
without papal services. … The final, and unheeded, protest by Innocent X [Pope
from 1644-1655] against the peace treaties … showed starkly the gulf between the
political-religious claims of the papacy and the realities of European political
life.94
In this incident, as well as in the general tenor of the Westphalian negotiations, was a
decisive turn away from the religio-social, political amalgam that had dominated the
Western world for well over a thousand years. Again, while the Peace of Westphalia dealt
with many religious issues, it was its subordination of sacred concerns to those of the
state which signaled that the conclusion of the Thirty Years’ War would also bring to a
close the story of Corpus Christianum. From Westphalia forward, many of the national
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and political concerns of the modern Western world became visible. It is important at this
point to briefly summarize some of the specific political outcomes for the powers
represented at Osnabrück and Münster and to briefly comment on their significance.
The Establishment of a New Order After the Peace of Westphalia
Outcomes for the Habsburgs
The Thirty Years’ War not only proved to be the end of the Habsburg dream of a
Christendom reunited under Roman Catholicism, it also proved to be the undoing of
Habsburg hegemony in European affairs. The Spanish-Habsburg line would come to an
abrupt end in 1706 with the death of the physically and mentally handicapped Charles II.
This severely curtailed the wealth and resources of the Habsburg monarchs. Never again
would Europe be controlled between the designs of an allied front made up of Habsburgs
from Spain and Austria.
Nonetheless, the House of Habsburg in Austria would survive, even thrive.
Though Ferdinand III accepted a diminished role in wider German and European affairs,
Austria, with its capital at Vienna, became a much more centralized power. This
consolidation of Habsburg holdings, along with the Westphalian settlement’s general
strengthening of state power vis-à-vis religious concerns produced an Austria which was
allowed to pursue its own religious and political policies. Austria became a power in its
own right and remained a bastion of Roman Catholicism. It was the undisputed center of
what remained of Habsburg rule and would continue to exert influence in Germany until
its defeat in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866.
Outcomes for Germany and the “Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation”
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The German lands of the Holy Roman Empire were ravaged by the Thirty Years’
War. In addition, the political structure of Germany was left in tatters. As Stephen Lee
has insightfully remarked: “Between 1648 and its eventual dissolution by Napoleon in
1806, the Empire never again functioned as a political unit. The future belonged, instead,
to a select number of individual states.”95 The vacuum of power created by the Empire’s
demise left three important problems for the German states. First, they had to deal with
the practical outworking of the Westphalian settlement – a settlement which left no real
mechanism for dealing with litigation from the war. Second, few overarching political
structures were left intact as there was no longer an Empire-wide constitution. Third,
each of the German states was left with the yeoman task of repairing war-time damage
and creating a climate for renewed economic development. The states that were most
successful in dealing with these challenges were those which grew in power.
In addition to the above mentioned problems, there was another practical reality
held over from the Thirty Years’ War – the profound potential for armed conflict among
states now competing for political and economic dominance in the German lands.
Richard Bonney has insightfully summarized the situation: “The Peace of Westphalia left
Germany as a profoundly militarized society, with a strong potential for internecine
conflict.”96
The growing competition among select German states coupled with the military
build-up during and after the Thirty Years’ War would profoundly affect the future of
Germany. Ultimately, Brandenburg-Prussia would grow to be the most dominant power
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in the German lands and entered into prolonged rivalry and conflict with the remaining
House of Habsburg in Austria. Several reasons for the rise of Brandenburg-Prussia can be
deduced. First, it made out very favorably in the Westphalian settlement, gaining its
historic holdings as well as the important duchy of Magdeburg. Second, BrandenburgPrussia had repeatedly been marched across and devastated during the war. As a result,
when the conflict was ended a concerted effort was made to strengthen its military
defenses. Third, when the absolute monarchy of Louis XIV of France unleashed a fresh
wave of persecution on Huguenots in France, Brandenburg-Prussia sought to draw in the
immigrants who had been hardened in battle. This contributed to the military strength of
Brandenburg-Prussia and provided, through the religious sensibilities of Reformed
Christianity, a strong sense of Prussian destiny. Ultimately, this potent mix of factors
would come forth through the Napoleonic Wars and would fashion Brandenburg-Prussia
into a formidable power. Prussia eventually defeated France under Napoleon III and
defeated Austria-Hungary in 1866 to create a German Empire with Prussia as its head in
1871. The German tendency toward militarism and domination as witnessed in the world
wars of the twentieth-century had many of its roots formed in the situation that grew out
of the Thirty Years’ War.
Outcomes for Sweden
Though Sweden, under Gustavus Adolphus, had turned the tide of the conflict,
eventually the Thirty Years’ War would exact a heavy toll from Sweden. Sweden
received considerable land holdings in Germany and a cash settlement of 5 million
thalers. However, despite its gains, Sweden struggled: “Unlike France, Sweden accepted
its gains as full imperial Estates, giving it representation in the Reichstag as well as the
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Lower and Upper Saxon assemblies. … [However] Swedish authority remained curtailed
by imperial law.”97 This decision to administer its gains within the Westphalian
construction of the reconfigured Holy Roman Empire all but insured that Sweden gained
almost nothing for its own kingdom. Tax proceeds and natural resources rarely benefited
Sweden proper and instead were funneled back into its German holdings for
administration and operation. The Swedish monarchy became embroiled in civil conflict
from independence movements and failed to strengthen its position in Germany. It
swiftly receded from the international scene and by the early eighteenth-century it was no
longer a formidable power in Europe.
Outcomes for France
Arguably, France gained more from the Thirty Years’ War than any other
European power. Stephen Lee’s summation of the situation illustrates France’s situation
after the war: ““[T]here can be little doubt that the period from 1648 onwards saw the
completion of most of Richilieu’s original ambitions: the separation of the Spanish and
Austrian Habsburgs, the expansion of the French frontier into the Empire, and the
substitution of French for Spanish military supremacy in Europe.”98 Additionally, France
not only became militarily superior to Spain, she essentially ended Spanish influence in
Europe. Under the conditions of the Peace of Westphalia, Spanish territories were given
to France – even though the Franco-Spanish conflict would not be completed until 1659.
Nonetheless, though France was ascendant, the seeds for her downfall were also
sown during this period. France’s victory and subsequent rise went hand-in-hand with the
growing dominance of the monarchy. Julian Swann writes, “[O]nce France had officially
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listed the Thirty Years’ War in 1635, the government’s desperate need for funds obliged
it to circumvent traditional judicial and administrative officeholders, whose loyalty and
efficiency were questioned.”99 This situation under Louis XIII led to a crippling of the
aristocratic nobility in France. After the Thirty Years’ War, the French would struggle
through a series of civil wars known as La Fronde. During the Fronde, aristocratic nobles
sought to curtail the abuses of the monarchy. The revolts were put down handily, and
afterward Louis XIV strengthened his throne into an “absolute monarchy.” Upon his
death, the aristocratic nobility sought to regain power during the reigns of Louis XV and
XVI. However, due to their efforts to reclaim privileged status, they ultimately crippled
efforts for egalitarian reforms, with devastating effects:
According to this interpretation, the death of Louis XIV was followed almost
immediately by a reaction of powerful privileged groups led by the parlements,
the Catholic Church and the court aristocracy. Their largely selfish opposition to
egalitarian reform of the fiscal system paved the way to the royal bankruptcy that
preceded the revolution of 1789.100
In just over a hundred years, France would see her stock fall from the heights of
her triumph over Spain and the Habsburgs. The French Revolution plunged the country
into terrible ruin, paving the way for the rise of the dictator Napoleon. After Napoleon’s
eventual defeat, the West saw the long decline of French fortunes (despite her colonial
gains).
Outcomes for Spain and the Netherlands
France’s longtime enemy, Spain, began the Thirty Years’ War as a still-dominant
power in Europe with a strong position as one part of the powerful Habsburg line. By the
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end of the conflict, Spain effectively ceased to be an independent, imperial power. It was
forced to make many concessions in the Treaty of Westphalia. Knowing that war with
France was still a reality, “Philip IV drew the logical conclusion from this situation and
came to terms with the United Provinces. Spanish recognition of the complete
independence of the United Provinces and the closing of the Scheldt were hard to
swallow but did not call for any change in the position as it had existed for many
years.”101
The Spanish monarch thought that ending the long war with the Dutch would free
Spain to focus on finally defeating the French and regaining a foothold as a dominant
force in European politics. However, this was not to be the case. Without its Dutch
holdings and saddled with extreme debt, Spain grew too weak to continue to fund its
military and expansionist obligations. The Dutch had gained their independence and
France was now the strongest state in the region. For Spain, the world had turned on its
head. She would retreat into absolute monarchy and entrenched Roman Catholicism,
never again to rise to her former glory.
Outcomes for Wider Europe
As the Thirty Years’ War came to a close with the Peace of Westphalia, a
recognizably “modern” Europe was emerging. Though different in combination and exact
borders from its twenty-first century form, the reshaping of the Western world would
produce a recognizable nation-state of France, the beginnings of German unification
under Prussian (Brandenburg-Prussia) power, the bloc of Austria-Hungary, an
independent Netherlands, a diminished-but-independent Spain, a small-but-independent
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Sweden and Denmark, and a free Switzerland (largely uninvolved in the war, but still
included in the terms of the peace). The power blocs that would come to dominate
Europe into the twentieth century also began to emerge at this time. Even England –
largely disengaged and unaffected during the war – was in the process of working
through its own religious questions and would eventually emerge as a strong,
“secularized” power in early modern Europe.
Europe was transformed as secularized political life and detectably “modern”
national boundaries rose from the ashes of Corpus Christianum:
The treaty gave the Swiss independence of Austria and the Netherlands
independence of Spain. The German principalities secured their autonomy.
Sweden gained territory and a payment in cash. Brandenburg and Bavaria made
gains too, and France acquired most of Alsace-Lorraine. The prospect of a Roman
Catholic reconquest of Europe vanished forever.102
In fact, the religio-social, political framework of Corpus Christianum had been
irrevocably altered.
The Toll of the War on Germany, Europe, and the Western World
The Reshaping of the Psyche of Germany and Europe
In addition to the rise of secularized, nation-state politics over/against a Churchstate nexus, as well as the reshaping of boundaries along national-ethnic-territorial lines,
the psyche of Germany and Europe was remade as a result of the Thirty Years’ War.
Modern scholarship has widely debated the extent of a “cultural myth” of devastation and
suffering drawn from Germany’s experience in the Thirty Years’ War.103 In the wake of
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World War I and World War II some scholars were reluctant to “coddle” Germans as
victims. However, Randall Hansen has penned an important statement regarding this
tendency: “Scholars began to write about the ‘myth’ of suffering and total destruction
during the Thirty Years’ War. Yet, even this scholarship did not nullify the claim that
destruction and suffering were meted out on a previously unprecedented scale.”104
It is true that certain areas of Germany were repeatedly destroyed while others
were little-touched. Yet, in the final analysis, the German countryside, as well as the
peasant population of the German lands, was shattered. Heinze remarks, “The big losers
in the war were the German people. For thirty years armies had lived off the land,
looting, raping, and destroying. The empire suffered very severe population losses. It is
estimated that there may have been as many as eight million fewer inhabitants in
Germany at the end of the war than there were in the beginning.”105 Again, while it is
plausible to accept that a significant number of reports were exaggerated, even false, the
suffering of the populace was very real. In fact, one scholar has argued that the “rhetoric
of death and destruction” in contemporary accounts of the war was a part of the shared
reality of the populace. In other words, even if some of the rhetoric was not factual, it
gave voice to the very real grief and suffering of the people during the war, a grief and
suffering that became a palpable part of the social fabric of German life.106
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The suffering of the populace and the attendant destruction, in the German lands
but also in wider Europe, was truly horrific. Estimates for the population loss in Germany
run from a high of 40% to a low of 20%. For the peasant population, mistreatment at the
hands of mercenary soldiers was a constant fear. Additionally, aside from the threat of
physical violence, famine and disease were ever-present realities. By any account, the
Thirty Years’ War was a time of deep desolation and it profoundly affected the populace.
The “Collapse” of Corpus Christianum
The tremendous suffering actually experienced by the population, as well as the
shared consciousness of devastation and loss in the popular psyche, was not without its
effect on religion:
[T]hough the Reformation had been saved, it suffered, along with Catholicism,
from a skepticism encouraged by the coarseness of religious polemics, the
brutality of the war, and the cruelties of belief. … Men began to doubt creeds that
preached Christ and practiced wholesale fratricide. They discovered the political
and economic motives that hid under religious formulas, and they suspected their
rulers of having no real faith but the lust for power.107
In short, the greatest casualty of the Thirty Years’ War was the loss of a defined nexus of
religio-social, political meaning as previously provided in Corpus Christianum.
Historians, for all of their wrangling over whether or not the Thirty Years’ War
was truly fought for religious reasons, are largely united in seeing that the overarching
result of the conflict was the un-mendable fracture of the Christian ordering of the
Western world that had lasted for more than a millennia. For instance, Koenigsberger
writes, “After 1648 there was a real change. Religion might still produce sympathy or
antipathy between states, but it no longer determined alliances nor did it lead countries
into war. From 1648 until the French Revolution the European states were engaged in
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pure power struggles.”108 The militancy and brutality of professing Christians against one
another had discredited the militant viewpoint that sought to forcibly unite all of society
under the banner of a single, unified Christendom.109
Even the Church as an institution was called deeply into question. Mark Noll
comments, “Recent historians have suggested that the churches may have been used as
puppets by military imperialists in this struggle, but the war still led to a growing sense
that it was necessary to reduce the visibility of religion in order to have peace in the dayto-day life of European nations.”110 While official designations of a region as “Lutheran,”
or “Catholic,” or “Reformed,” continued to exist, there was never again in the Western
world a return to the holistic religio-social, political conception of reality as witnessed in
Corpus Christianum. In truth, skepticism regarding the practicality and truthfulness of
religion – especially Christianity – would begin to take deep root in the Western world.
Christendom ceased to be the dominant reality of Early Modern Europe: “[W]ith the
religious divisions caused by the Reformation and Counter-reformation, [people] had lost
the last shreds of the never very strong medieval feelings for the communitas
Christianiae, the community of Christendom.”111
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New Worldviews and Structures for a Post-Christendom World
The Rise of Secularization and the Enlightenment
With the collapse of Corpus Christianum and the cessation of hostilities new
structures and attitudes began to be adopted. Ironically, “the religious wars played a
major role in bringing about a degree of toleration, since neither party was able to
annihilate the other, and the participants emerged from these lengthy wars too exhausted
to continue trying to achieve religious unity by the suppression of the opposition.”112 This
growing religious toleration became a fertile ground for ‘tolerating’ other viewpoints –
even the skeptical attitude which had begun to inundate modern science and philosophy.
A long march toward secularization in the Western world was commenced and the
Enlightenment was born.
The Enlightenment was (and is) a notoriously flexible concept. Suffice it to say,
though, at its core it was motivated by a growing confidence in reason, scientific
endeavor, and human progress. The Enlightenment era rose from the ashes of the Thirty
Years’ War and stretched from the middle decades of the seventeenth century up through
the late eighteenth century. It was marked by impressive discoveries about the natural
world, and revolutions in philosophy and the social order. Additionally, it was decidedly
irreligious. Religion did not recede completely during this era. In fact, attempts were
made by certain powers – notably France and Spain – to retrench and reestablish a
modified version of Corpus Christianum. However, even these attempts would be
quelled. The Enlightenment was a period of growing secularization and it marked the
beginning of the West’s reformulation under a decidedly non-religious banner. Certainly,
important exceptions to this general trend would come to the fore. The Great Awakening
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of the eighteenth century in England and the British colonies constituted one important
example. Yet, even in times of religious revival, the religio-social, political order of the
Western world was never again to be characterized by an all-encompassing church-state
bond. Enlightenment figure Denis Diderot famously summed up the new outlook: “Never
shall man be free until the last king has been strangled with the entrails of the last
priest.”113
As the Durants remarked, “Even in this darkest of modern ages an increasing
number of men turned to science and philosophy for answers less incarnadined than those
which the faiths had so violently sought to enforce. … The Peace of Westphalia ended
the reign of theology over the European mind, and left the road obstructed but passable
for the tentatives of reason.”114 The general intellectual and cultural milieu of the era was
a fertile ground for the growing secularization of society. Aside from a few short-lived
exceptions, former-Christendom began a decisive move toward a thoroughly secularized
future. In the German lands, particularly, the growing power of Brandenburg-Prussia was
largely due to a decision to unite around German language, German culture, and
militarization.115 In every corner in which Corpus Christianum had once been the rule,
new democratic structures, which were not dependent on the church, began to grow. The
Peace of Westphalia and the religious exhaustion which had been brought on by the
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Thirty Years’ War helped to birth the Enlightenment and ensured that never again would
anything like the “medieval synthesis” of Corpus Christianum exist.
Absolute Monarchy: Corpus Christianum Revisited and Found Wanting
The notable, though temporary, exceptions to the secularizing trend were the
absolute monarchies that rose in several of the nation-states of former-Christendom.
Many of these failed quickly. A few, especially England and the Netherlands, emerged to
become exemplars of the post-Christendom world:
The greatest transformations occurred in the United Provinces and in England.
There, compromise solutions were found: mixed constitutions, the emancipation
of intellectual life from clerical control, and the development of open and flexible,
even though highly differentiated, social structures. These were the differences
which were to determine the course of European history for the next hundred and
fifty years.116
However, this was not the case with a few of the important Catholic powers,
particularly France and Spain. In each of these countries, the privileged status of Roman
Catholicism under the rule of a divinely appointed monarch was reasserted. In a very
important sense, this represented an attempt to reestablish Corpus Christianum, albeit in a
modified form. This attempt was most successfully carried out in France under the
absolute monarchy of the “Sun King,” Louis XIV. During his reign, France grew as an
important power, the Roman Catholic faith was elevated, and the power of the monarch
to control that faith was practiced.
Louis XV and XVI attempted to carry forward this reformulated Corpus
Christianum. However, the re-visitation of Christendom under the system of absolute
monarchy would eventually succumb to the secular force of the Enlightenment age. This
led to the French Revolution and the unraveling of French society in the “Reign of
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Terror.” Out of the ashes of this reign would raise the new attempt to find a universal
organizing principle for the Western world, the universal state. Napoleon Bonaparte
sought to bring France and the world under his rule. His eventual defeat did not lead
France or Europe back toward a fusion of Christianity and political life. Instead, in the
now very secularized states of Europe, attempts at universalizing secular rule were made
through colonial ventures. Eventually, tensions between the European powers led to
German ascendance and the conditions that led up to the world wars of the twentieth
century.
In the final analysis, Christendom was finished. Many factors had converged
during the seventeenth century to ensure that that the Western world was pushed toward
what scholars discuss as the “General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century.”117 Whatever
one concludes about the general upheaval of that era, it is demonstrably true that the
period after the Thirty Years’ War was the beginning of a new religio-social, political
journey for the West. From the Peace of Westphalia forward, former-Christendom was
reshaped and reformulated into the world of modernity, characterized by Enlightenment
rationality, secularized politics, and the privatization of religious sentiment.
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CONCLUSION
Norman Davies, in his massive tome, Europe: A History wrote, “The Thirty Years
War … may be seen as an episode in the age-old German conflict between Emperor and
princes. At another level, it may be seen as an extension of the international wars of
religion between Catholic and Protestant; at yet another, as an important stage in a
Continental power-struggle involving most of the states and rulers of Europe.”118 All of
this is true. However, this thesis has argued more specifically that the Thirty Years’ War
was essentially religious in its beginnings, secular and “political” by its end, and that it
spelled the doom of Christendom. In fact, it was the last gasp for the religio-social,
political conglomerate known as Corpus Christianum.
Brief Summary of the Contours of this Study
By taking a “long view” of the origins of the conflict, the case was made that the
Thirty Years’ War, while multi-faceted, was an essentially religious conflict in its
beginnings through its first half. The parties which found themselves at war in the lands
of the “Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation” starting in 1618 were seeking to
stabilize the centuries old church-state nexus which had encompassed their world for
centuries and which had been destabilized by the Protestant Reformation. In the events of
the first half of the Thirty Years’ War, religious concerns and motivations were primary,
as the reunification of Christendom under a united church-state was sought. The
Bohemian revolt was fought by Calvinists who sought to resist the attempts of the
Catholic Habsburgs. The incursion of Denmark under King Christian IV was motivated
by his desire to come to the rescue of Protestantism, particularly the Lutheranism which
118
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he shared with many of the German princes. The Swedish phase, especially under
Gustavus Adolphus, was an attempt to work out the providential ascendancy of the
Protestant cause so that Christendom could be united under true religion. Whatever other
motivations were present, a discernable and central religious motivation can be seen in
the first part of the Thirty Years’ War as the combatants battled for the heart of Corpus
Christianum.
Nevertheless, as the conflict progressed, it became clear that neither side could
achieve religious or military dominance over the other. At this point, and especially after
France’s formal entrance into the fighting in 1635, the Thirty Years’ War devolved into
unprincipled carnage and chaos dominated by nation-state goals and ends. The last fifteen
years of the conflict would continue to pit ostensibly “Protestant” and “Catholic” armies
against one another. However, this was no longer even superficially true. Roman Catholic
France fought the Roman Catholic Habsburgs of Germany and Spain for reasons of
political and territorial advantage and not religious principle. In the Protestant armies,
much religious motivation was lost when Gustavus Adolphus died. Mercenaries came to
dominate the conflict as the German lands and Europe descended into death, destruction,
and devastation. The folly of Christians maiming and killing one another in the name of
the Prince of Peace became apparent and the stage was set for religion to recede as a
unifying animus in the Western world.
The Peace of Westphalia would cement the collapse of Corpus Christianum as the
territorial and/or nation-state ruler was given authority over religious disputes and
religious sensibility began to be pushed into the private world of the individual believer.
Additionally, the hatred and violence, which had been carried out in the name of the
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Christian religion, began to undermine the very idea of religion itself. Enlightenment
rationality and secularized political thinking took hold. Brief attempts at returning to
Corpus Christianum were eventually crushed, and a recognizably modern world began to
emerge. Events and conditions coalesced which would eventually give rise to the modern
Western world.
Closing Thoughts
As this study comes to a close, it is perhaps appropriate to go beyond
summarization to an evaluation of the results of the Thirty Years’ War. If the casualty of
the war truly was Corpus Christianum, the question must be asked: was this a good
consequence or not? Should religion be kept fundamentally separate from the life of the
polis? Was Constantine wrong? Was Augustine right in theory but wrong in practice?
It is tempting quickly to answer, “Yes!” Yet, this would be too simple. Robert
Markus, in his landmark study on history and society in the thought of Augustine offers
an important word at this juncture:
For the polis-centered tradition of Greek thought the political framework of
human life was the chief means of achieving human perfection. Life in a city-state
was an education for virtue, a fully human life, the good life. Politics was a
creative task. …
In Judaeo-Christian tradition the key-note of political thinking was
different. The people of God, whether of the old or the new Covenants, could not
think of themselves as citizens involved in creating the right order in society, nor
of their leaders as entrusted with bringing such an order into being. Only God’s
saving act could establish the one right social order. In relation to that kingdom
they were subjects, not agents; in relation to all other, human, kingdoms, they
were aliens rather than citizens. In relation to neither God’s nor men’s kingdoms
could they therefore think of themselves as active participants in a creative
political task. …
Although Augustine came to repudiate the ‘creative’ conception of politics
characteristic of the classical tradition, this was only the first major development
of his own political reflection. In the end he was not content with this rejection. In
the final phase of his thought there is an obstinate sense of a need to give more
weight to the political order than it could bear in the perspective of a stark,
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biblical repudiation of ‘creative’ politics. A way had to be found for reconciling
the Christian’s sense of having no abiding city here with some real political
participation in a commitment to a city which was far from an abiding one.119
The point communicated in the preceding paragraphs is an important one as we
evaluate the outcomes of the Thirty Years’ War. Earlier in this thesis, a somewhat critical
view of Augustine’s “inconsistencies” regarding the idea of a distinct-in-theory, but
united-in-practice civitas dei and civitas terrena was espoused. However, it is now time
to qualify that view. The struggles of Christendom, especially as they were played out in
the horrors of the Thirty Years’ War, understandably led to the politically secular nationstates of the modern era. However, have the horrors of the modern nation-state been any
less dramatic than the travails of the church-state? Many, including this author, would
argue that the answer to that question is a resounding, “No!” Why is this so? Could it be
that the once-revered, now-dismissed genius Arnold J. Toynbee was correct when he
warned that the disintegration of society would be the result of a universal (secular)
state?120 Again, this author thinks that he was correct and agrees with the sentiment:
“Nihilistic politics arises when the modern state reassumes the role of sacrificer but then
realizes there are no more gods to receive the sacrifice – no more gods but itself.”121
The Thirty Years’ War originated because the Church had largely lost the ability
to exist apart from the state. As the Protestant Reformation reawakened many toward the
essentially prophetic stance of the Church in relation to the polis and the world, massive
conflict ensued. Corpus Christianum, as the dominant religio-social, political reality was
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a necessary casualty of this conflict. However, perhaps the baby was thrown out with the
proverbial bathwater. Religious toleration and freedom of conscience were and are
important and necessary realities for peace on this earth. However, the radical
secularization that largely removed Christianity from Western, public life after the Thirty
Years’ War led not to peace but instead set in place conditions, which would eventually
contribute to the devastating world wars and Communist revolutions of the twentieth
century. Perhaps now, over three and a half centuries since the beginning of the
recognizably modern West, it is time to consider again how the Christian can participate
in the politics of this world while remaining true, in an ultimate sense, to the One True
Ruler of all the kingdoms of the world. Perhaps the terrible period of history known as
the Thirty Years’ War, along with its outcomes, can provide useful soil for considering
how the Church of today can be “salt and light” in society once again.
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